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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THREE ESSAYS ON GROCERY SALES TAXES
Grocery sales taxes represent a stable tax revenue stream for state and municipal
government, but there is rare empirical evidence suggesting grocery taxes may adversely
affect health. In addition, the how governments set grocery sales taxes is still unclear.
Therefore, based on a novel national dataset of annual county and state-level grocery taxes
from 2009 through 2016, the following three essays in the dissertation investigate the
health impacts of grocery sales taxes and the causes of grocery sales taxes in a framework
of tax competition.
In the first essay, we document the spatial and temporal variation in grocery taxes and
empirically examine the statistical relationship between county-level grocery taxes and
obesity and diabetes. We link the tax data to three-year, county-level estimates based on
data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention on rates of obesity and diabetes
and provide a nation-wide spatial characterization of grocery taxes and these two health
outcomes. Using a county-level fixed effects estimator, we estimate the effect of grocery
taxes on obesity and diabetes rates, also controlling for a subset of potential confounders
that vary over time. We find a one percentage point increase in grocery taxes is associated
with 0.588 and 0.215 percentage point increases in the county-level obesity and diabetes
rates. In conclusion, Counties with grocery taxes have increased prevalence of obesity and
diabetes. We estimate the economic burden of increased obesity and diabetes rates resulting
from grocery taxes to be $5.9 billion. Based on this estimate, the benefit-cost ratio of
removing grocery taxes is 1.90 across the United States if we only consider the effects on
obesity and diabetes rates.
In the second essay, we aim to examine whether grocery sales taxes make significant
impacts on individual’s body weight outcome. We merged the county-level grocery tax
data with the individual longitudinal data from Panel Study Income Dynamics (PSID) and
explore a fixed effect model to estimate the causal impact of grocery sales taxes on family
food expenditures and individual BMI (Body Mass Index). After that, we conduct the
analysis of heterogeneous effects by income category and obesity level to identify the
policy impacts on different individuals and families. We find that a ten point-percentage
increase in grocery sales rate leads to a rise of BMI by 0.61 (which roughly translates to a
body weight gain of 1.68kg). The results are more significant for the overweight population
whose BMI is greater than 25 but smaller than 30. We do not find significant results
towards different income population.
In the third essay, we study the state-county tax policy interaction patterns and explore the
causes of grocery sales tax changes considering spatial externalities under a Stackelberg
tax competition model with three propositions. Derivatized from the model, county grocery
tax rates are affected by states’ grocery tax rates (vertical effects), neighboring counties’

grocery tax rates (horizontal effects) and neighboring states’ grocery tax rates (diagonal
effects). By employing the twelve-year data of state and county grocery taxes, we also
empirically examine the three propositions in a spatial autoregressive model. The empirical
results are consistent with the three theoretical proportions. The average county grocery
sales tax rate is less than the average state grocery sales tax rate, and we find the county
grocery tax rate changes negatively with its domestic state grocery sales tax rate.
Neighboring counties play a large role in determining the local county grocery tax rates.
For example, a county will increase its grocery tax rates by 0.780-point percentages if its
neighboring county increases one percentage point tax rate on average. Neighboring state
tax rates can also positively affect a county’s grocery tax rate. A county is expected to
increase its grocery tax rate by 0.110 percentage point when its neighboring states increase
state grocery tax rate by one percentage point on average.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Grocery sales taxes were first levied over the Great Depression, yet during the past two
decades, seven states have consecutively exempted grocery sales taxes, which provoked an
intense discussion on the impacts of grocery sales taxes and repeals of the taxes. Some
researchers argued that “the persistence for the grocery tax is strange” because most local
governments have already given up taxing groceries (Tate, 2018). Indeed, only thirteen
states persist on the taxes, five of which levy the taxes at limited rates, and three of which
provide different levels of tax refund credits. However, policymakers in the with-tax states
are unwilling to cut the grocery sales taxes because the taxes contribute considerably to the
local government finances.
In most states and counties, grocery sales tax rates are different from general sales
tax rates. Since the Great Depression when general sales states were created, some states
and governments have decided to exempt groceries from the sales taxes. This is where the
tax division come from. More divisions come up when some states and counties levy
grocery taxes at limited rates, while some levy at the same rates as general sales taxes (full
rates). The dissertation focusses on the grocery sales tax policy instead of the general sales
taxes.
This dissertation is a collection of three essays that explore the impacts and causes
of the grocery tax changes and discuss repealing the tax. Although a few studies have
investigated the impacts of grocery sales taxes on food related outcomes, there are also
topics that remain unexplored. First, there is no empirical research investigating the
impacts of grocery taxes on health outcomes such as obesity and diabetes. Second, most of
the research fails to track the causal influence due to the limit of micro panel data. Third,
1

there is limited academic analysis on the causes of grocery sales tax changes in the
framework of tax competition, even though over 100 counties changed grocery sales tax
rates more than 300 times during the past decade, according to the tax data we collected
and used in this dissertation. Therefore, in the dissertation, the three essays emphasizing
on the above blank aspects target to enrich the investigation of grocery sales taxes.
The first essay examines the impact of grocery taxes on health outcomes, including
obesity and diabetes. The income effects and substitution effects of grocery taxes change
consumers’ food choices, finally influencing people’s weights and blood sugar levels. By
exploiting U.S. county-level data from 2009 to 2016, and controlling for other socioeconomic factors, results from the multiple linear regression show that higher grocery sales
taxes are associated with higher obesity.
The second essay follows the association found in the first essay, aiming to identify
the causal impacts of grocery taxes on body weight outcome using individual longitudinal
data. The county grocery taxes are merged with the family and individual level data from
PSID. By employing the fixed-effect model, the reduction impacts of grocery sales taxes
on body weight are found. In our preferred model, one point percentage decrease in grocery
tax rate leads to 0.061 BMI decrease translating to 0.168 kg reduction in body weight on
average.
The last essay explores the causes of grocery sales tax changes considering both
spatial externalities and vertical externalities. Based on a spatial econometric model, the
grocery tax rate of a county is positively affected by its neighbor counties and states,
showing the evidence of spatial autocorrelation of grocery tax among counties. Vertical
interaction also plays a significant role, and we find evidence that county-level tax rates
2

increase as state-level tax rates decrease given that the average county-level tax rate is
smaller than the state-level tax rate.
Taxing groceries is a pivotal decision for local governments, and the grocery tax
rates are also important food policies that influence every citizen’s life. Although there are
passionate debates on tax exemption for groceries in the society amongst policy makers,
the impacts and motivations of cutting the taxes have not been thoroughly examined.
Through this dissertation research, I hope to provide a rigorous evaluation of these
important issues.
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CHAPTER 2. GROCERY FOOD TAXES AND U.S. COUNTY OBESITY AND DIABETES RATES
2.1 Introduction
Grocery sales taxes (hereafter referred as grocery taxes) are sales taxes imposed on grocery
foods and exist in the form of a state tax, a county tax, or both in sixteen U.S. states. Taxing
groceries is an attractive revenue source for state and municipal governments because
grocery sales are relatively stable; thus, protecting facilitates budgeting planning even
during times of economic downturn. Of course, grocery taxes make grocery foods more
expensive, which society may feel most during times of economic downturn as lower
income households become even more food insecure. For example, coronavirus disease
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic began in early 2020 and food insecurity sky-rocketed in the
United States—in April 2020, food insecurity increased to 23%. i Not surprisingly, food
insecurity is associated with social problems (particularly for children) such as health
(Cook et al., 2004; Dunifon & Kowaleski-Jones, 2003; Weinreb et al., 2002), psychological
(Alaimo, Olson, & Frongillo, 2001), and behavioral problems (Slack & Yoo, 2005;
Whitaker, Phillips, & Orzol, 2006); therefore, policies thought to impact food insecurity
and health have been extensively studied. Notably, there are studies that have analyzed the
impacts of specific food taxes, such as soda taxes, on consumption and health. Recent
examples include studies showing that at-risk subpopulations such as obese children
coming from low-income families are more sensitive to soda taxes (J. M. Fletcher, D. E.
Frisvold, & N. Tefft, 2010c; Sturm, Powell, Chriqui, & Chaloupka, 2010).
In contrast, the relationship between grocery taxes and health outcomes has
received little attention. This is somewhat surprising given that relative to soda taxes,
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grocery taxes are far more common, a significantly larger percentage tax on average, and
they apply to all grocery foods so represent a considerably larger share of household
income. The current lack of research on the impacts of grocery taxes is unfortunate since
it is during times of economic hardship, such as a COVID-19 (Coronavirus Disease 2019)
induced recession, that policies such as grocery taxes receive greater consideration as a
source of stable tax revenue for state and local governments.

2.2 Literature Review
Grocery taxes can affect the odds of eating at home versus dining out through changing the
relative effective prices (tax included price) of grocery and restaurant foods. Compared
with states such as New York where restaurant foods are taxed while grocery foods are tax
exempt, taxing both grocery and restaurant foods in states like Alabama creates more of a
disincentive to eat at home (French, 2003). For the poorest segment of the population, fast
food restaurants become their primary option as a substitute for grocery foods because fast
food restaurants are both more accessible (Powell, Chaloupka, & Bao, 2007; Rydell et al.,
2008) and cheaper (Khan, Powell, & Wada, 2012). In particular, two recent empirical
studies show that grocery taxes reduced U.S. consumers’ grocery food expenditures and
increased restaurant food expenditure, and restaurant food sales taxes increased U.S.
consumers’ grocery food expenditures (Dong, Zheng, & Stewart, 2020; Zheng, Dong,
Burney, & Kaiser, 2019b). Therefore, the substitution from grocery food to fast food in
response to taxing groceries may increase the odds of unhealthy outcomes since there is
evidence that consumption of fast food affects a person’s risk of becoming both obese
(Chou, Grossman, & Saffer, 2004) and diabetic (Pereira et al., 2005).
5

Unlike soda or fat taxes, grocery taxes apply to thousands of grocery items and may
effectively change consumers’ grocery food choices. Though not all grocery foods are
healthy, reduced consumption of fruits and vegetables may induce obesity (Darmon &
Drewnowski, 2015) and diabetes (Popkin, 2015), and food-at-home is widely considered
healthier than food-away-from-home. Therefore, we hypothesize that health outcomes are
negatively correlated with grocery taxes. We choose two health outcome measures for this
study: obesity and diabetes rates within a county, because food consumption is closely
related to obesity and diabetes.
It is well known that individuals gain weight whenever consumed calories exceeds
expended calories (Finkelstein, Ruhm, & Kosa, 2005). Yet, rates of obesity vary
significantly from person to person according to the individual’s social economic status
(McLaren, 2007) like education (Cohen, Rai, Rehkopf, & Abrams, 2013), income (Pickett,
Kelly, Brunner, Lobstein, & Wilkinson, 2005), gender (Kanter & Caballero, 2012), age,
and race (Wolf et al., 1993). In addition, individual body mass index (BMI) is also highly
related with individual risky behavior such as smoking (Courtemanche, Tchernis, & Ukert,
2018) and alcohol consumption (Sayon-Orea, Martinez-Gonzalez, & Bes-Rastrollo, 2011).
However, these individual-level reasons do not explain fully the increasing prevalence of
obesity across the entire society over time.
Researchers from multiple disciplines have identified various underlying causes of
obesity epidemic from different perspectives, such as decreasing price per calorie (Darmon
& Drewnowski, 2015), high availability of fast food, high cost of healthy food (Wiggins et
al., 2015), difficulty to access healthy food especially for lower-income households (Jetter
& Cassady, 2006), and the high amount of marketing of unhealthy food and beverages
6

especially among younger children (Harris, Pomeranz, Lobstein, & Brownell, 2009).
While the evidence is mixed, some studies have identified physical inactivity as a cause
for obesity, attributed to urban sprawl (Vandegrift & Yoked, 2004), labor-saving devices
such as dish washers (Ng & Popkin, 2012), and increasingly sedentary occupations (Thorp,
Owen, Neuhaus, & Dunstan, 2011). Similar to findings in the obesity literature, the rising
rates of diabetes has been attributed in part to environmental factors, such as the abundance
of food supply and sedentary lifestyles (Barnett, Eff, Leslie, & Pyke, 1981; Marx, 2002;
Zimmet, 1982). In fact, 60% of diabetes cases can be attributed to being obese or
overweight (Ezzati, Lopez, Rodgers, & Murray, 2004).
In terms of magnitude, the quantitative significance for obesity and diabetes risk
factors also varies widely. For instance, quitting smoking has been found to reduce body
mass index (BMI) by 1.8-1.9 units with a BMI above 30 defining obesity (Courtemanche
et al., 2018). As a separate example, a one percent increase in soda taxes has been
associated with a 0.013 decrease in average BMI (Sturm et al., 2010). Overall, there is not
clear consensus on the aggregate effects of different risk factors on either obesity or
diabetes rates, especially among individual studies that examine specific sub-populations.
In summary, the public health literature has identified a multitude of causes for the
rising obesity and diabetes epidemic in the United States, including prices, food availability
and accessibility, and marketing. The aim of this study is to examine another potential
factor which has not been investigated previously: the relationship between grocery food
taxes and health outcomes. Despite the fact that groceries are taxed in one third of U.S.
states as well as on-going debates on whether to impose significant grocery taxes (e.g.,
New Mexico and West Virginia) to our knowledge there is, no comprehensive dataset on
7

state and county-level grocery taxes. Therefore, one contribution of our work is the
development of a comprehensive dataset on state and county-level grocery taxes from 2009
through 2016, which we then link to county-level estimates of obesity and diabetes rates.
The main empirical contribution of our work is to estimate the effect of grocery taxes on
these two important health outcomes using our novel county-level panel data and a county
fixed effects estimator that also includes time-varying variables to control for
socioeconomic factors, risky behaviors, and food access and affordability environment. A
third contribution is policy-focused, we calculate benefit-cost ratios of eliminating grocery
taxes as a way to assess the quantitative significance of grocery taxes in determining
obesity and diabetes rates.

2.3 Methods
2.3.1 Data Organization and Structure
We organize county-level panel data consisting of six time periods on obesity and diabetes
rates, food taxes, socioeconomic characteristics, and risky health behaviors. Each of the six
periods is three years in length; thus, the unit of observation in the statistical analysis is the
county-three-year period. Each of the six periods in the study has a one-year overlap with
the subsequent period or the preceding period or both—Figure 1 depicts this somewhat
unique structure of our county-level panel data and empirical design. We develop this data
structure because the outcome variables of obesity and diabetes rates are only precisely
estimated and reported based on the average of a three year-sample window. Concordance
on the timing of measurements between the health outcome variables and the explanatory
variables requires that the food tax, socioeconomic, and risky health behavior variables
8

also be measured as three-year averages. A separate justification for measuring each
variable as a three-year average is that the adjustment of diets due to a tax change, and any
subsequent transition to or from obesity is not likely immediate.
2.3.2 Data Sources
We assemble a large set of data on state- and county-level grocery tax rates in the U.S.
from 2009 to 2016. The key independent variable of interest in this study is the total grocery
sales tax, measured as a percentage. The total tax is the sum of the state-level and countylevel grocery sales taxes. We also collect data on restaurant sales taxes, which we use to
calculate the ratio of the grocery to restaurant sales tax as an alternative explanatory
variable. The tax data are obtained from Bridging the Gap for state tax rates, Tax-Rates.org
for 2016 county rates, and state Departments of Revenue for the rest (by online searching
by two research assistants over an extended period of time).
Comparing with the panel data source of sales tax rates assembled by other
researchers (Agrawal, 2014, 2015), our dataset does not include municipal tax rates.
However, it is the first panel dataset that focuses on grocery tax rates, instead of general
sales tax rates. In addition, it contains national grocery tax data of state and county level
for as long as twelve years.
We assess two dependent variables in our analyses: 1) three-year county-level
obesity prevalence; and 2) three-year county-level diabetes prevalence. County-level rates
of diagnosed obesity and diabetes are obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) county data indicators (Centers for Disease Control Prevention, 2016),
which are three-year average rates calculated by CDC using annual surveys from the
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) (Centers for Disease Control and
9

Prevention, 2018) and are based on a three-year average to improve precision. For both
obesity and diabetes outcomes we use age-adjusted rates to measure the health outcomes.
We collect data for control variables in the regression analysis from multiple
sources on a wide range of socioeconomic data measured at the annual level. To conform
the explanatory variables with the dependent variable, we use the annual socioeconomic
data to construct three-year county level averages for use as control variables in the
regression analysis. The first set includes food environment/access/affordability including
the numbers of grocery stores, fast food restaurants, and full-service restaurants, and the
average cost per meal. The former three variables are from the Census Bureau’s County
Business Patterns (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018) and the latter is from Feeding America
(Feeding America, 2018). Socioeconomic measures on population, race, gender income,
employment and education are based on data from the Census Bureau’s Population
Estimates Program (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018.). The per capita income and employment
rate are from the Regional Economic Information System (REIS) (U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis, 2017).
Additional control variables include data on risky health behaviors, which are also
at the annual level and used for constructing three-year county-level averages. The countylevel prevalence estimates of smoking and alcohol use are obtained from BRFSS. Smoking
is measured as the percentage of adults in a county who both report that they currently
smoke every day or most days and have smoked at least 100 cigarettes in their lifetime.
Excessive alcohol use is the percentage of adults that report excessive alcohol consumption
in the past 30 days in each county. Data on drug-possession and driving under the influence
(DUI) arrests are obtained from the County Level Detailed Arrest and Offense Data
10

supported by the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program (U.S. Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2018). We divide the arrests by county population from REIS to obtain per capita
possessing-drug and DUI arrests.
In total we have tax data for 3,101 U.S. counties. We only keep 2,446 counties in
the dataset due to our study design. Moreover, 408 counties are lost when merging in
socioeconomic variables. After eliminating the 180 singleton counties, we are left with
1,858 counties including both urban and rural counties in the dataset. Of these counties, 87
experienced a grocery tax change in the year 2012, 2013 or 2014. The other 1,771 counties
experienced no grocery tax change during the study window (2009 – 2016); 1,250 of these
counties never have a grocery tax, while 521 have a constant grocery tax during the study
window. In terms of our entire panel of county-period observations, we only keep
observations for which the grocery tax is constant within the three-year period. As a
consequence, counties with grocery tax changes appear in exactly two periods each, which
correspond to either 1) the three-year periods before and after 2012, 2) the three-year
periods before and after 2013, or 3) the three-year periods before and after 2014. Counties
with no tax grocery tax changes during our study window will appear in each of the six
periods unless there is missing data for covariates in a county for some years. If our panel
of counties with no tax changes is balanced, then we would have 11,148 observations
(1,858 counties by 6). Of the 1,771 counties without tax changes, 1,319 of them appear in
all six periods. In terms of total county-period observations, we have, 9,979 observations;
9,805 observations from our panel of counties that never experience a tax change and 174
observations from counties that do experience a tax change.

11

2.3.3 Statistical Analysis
We estimate the effects of grocery taxes on obesity and diabetes rates resulting from
changes in county-level grocery taxes in the years 2012, 2013 and 2014. Our estimating
procedure uses a county fixed effects linear regression model for county-level, ageadjusted health outcomes. The main explanatory variables of interest are 1) grocery taxes
and 2) restaurant taxes. Our main parameter of interest describes how changes in the
county-level total grocery sales tax relates to county-level health outcomes on average,
after parsing out other observable variables and unobservable time-constant variables.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level to account for arbitrary intra-cluster
correlations between the error terms (Cameron & Miller, 2015). The regression model
controls for county-level food access, demographics, socioeconomics, and risky health
behaviors. The model also includes period fixed effects to control for period-specific time
shocks common to all counties and county fixed effects to control for county-specific timeinvariant factors.
In addition to the main analysis described above, we assess the robustness of our
results to an alternative measure of food taxes—the ratio of the grocery tax to the restaurant
tax. Because some counties have no restaurant tax, we add 0.01 to both the numerator and
denominator. This adjustment has only a small influence on the ratio when then the
restaurant tax is non-zero, which is the vast majority of observations. In all instances when
the restaurant tax is zero, the grocery tax is also zero, which makes the ratio equal to one
in such cases. To us this transformation is reasonable since it keeps intact the ratio when
the denominator is non-zero and implies parity when the denominator is zero.

12

2.3.4 Calculation of Health Burden and Benefit-Cost Ratio
We calculate the aggregate U.S. health burden of grocery tax rates in the year 2016 based
on direct costs of treating obesity and diabetes and the cost of mortalities. Direct costs are
measured as the medical expenditures for treating people with obesity and for treating
people with diabetes; the cost of mortalities is measured as the value of statistical life
(VSL). Our calculated estimates of annual expenditures (direct costs only) for treating
obesity and diabetes are $1,901 (American Diabetes Association, 2018) and $9,601 (Kim
& Basu, 2016), respectively.
The first step to calculate these aggregate health burdens is to calculate the
additional cases of people with obesity and diabetes at the county level. These counts are
calculated based on multiplying the regression coefficients relating grocery taxes to obesity
and diabetes by the grocery tax rate in a county, and then multiplying by the county
population. These products deliver county-level estimates of the additional people with
obesity and diabetes associated with an increase in the grocery tax rate. Next, we multiply
these additional cases of people with obesity and diabetes by our estimates of annual
medical expenditures on obesity/diabetes, which deliver estimates of health burdens
aggregated at the county level. To recover a national aggregate estimate, we aggregate our
county-level estimates across all counties with grocery taxes.
Next, we calculate benefit-cost ratios (BCRs) to summarize whether the health
benefits associated with reducing the grocery tax by one percentage point are likely to
exceed the cost of foregone tax revenues from the reduction. The numerator of the BCR
captures the health benefits per person of reducing the grocery tax by one percentage point.
This is calculated as the product of 1) the regression coefficient relating grocery taxes to a
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health outcome, 2) a one percentage point tax reduction, and 3) our calculated estimate for
annual expenditures on treatment. The denominator is the cost per person, in terms of
foregone tax revenue, of reducing grocery taxes by one percentage point. The average
annual food at-home expenditure of U.S. households was $4,363 (USDA ERS, Food
Expenditure Series), which translates to $1630.78 per person assuming average household
size was 2.6 (U.S. Census Bureau 2016); thus, a one percentage point reduction implies
$16.31 per person in foregone annual grocery tax revenue. If the benefit-cost ratio exceeds
one, then the marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost. We complete sensitivity analyses
for both the health burden and benefit-cost ratio calculations using different estimates for
the direct costs of treating obesity or diabetes for person with the condition.
We found variations among cost estimates; for example, a meta-analysis found that
the annual medical expenditures attributable to treating obesity for a person with the
condition varies from $1,239 to $2,582 (Kim & Basu, 2016). Therefore, in a sensitivity
analysis we consider low and high estimates for these figures. These results are
summarized in Table 2.4.
The health burden and BCR estimates do not take into account all of the potential
adverse impacts of grocery taxes; for example, they do not consider the indirect costs of
obesity or diabetes on quality of life or lost work productivity. We also note that obesity
and diabetes are related; our estimates of health burden are based on the assumption that
they are separate. It is possible that combining the health burden from obesity and diabetes
produces an over-estimate. On the other hand, as we have already suggested, the grocery
tax might be associated with other adverse effects for which we do not account (as another
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example, household food insecurity). Not accounting for these other mechanisms would
lead to an under-estimate.

2.4 Results
2.4.1 A Map of Grocery Taxes
Figure 2 presents a map of the United States depicting county-level grocery taxes along
with the top 12 most obese states identified in bold. This figure illustrates that grocery taxes
are more prevalent in states with the highest obesity rates.
2.4.2 Health Outcomes by Taxing Status
Figure 3 plots the average rates of obesity and diabetes from 2009 through 2016 for both
counties with and without a grocery tax (state, county, or both). Over this period, the
national average obesity and diabetes rates increased significantly, especially after 2013.
If we look at counties with and without grocery sales tax separately, the taxed counties are
less healthy. Specifically, the average obesity and diabetes rates of counties with taxes are
approximately 3 and 2.5 percentage points higher, respectively. Figure 3 clearly shows that
counties with a grocery tax were consistently worse for both obesity and diabetes.
2.4.3 Regression Results on Obesity and Diabetes Rates
In Table 2.1 we present the summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. The
first three columns in Table 2.2 report the regression results of obesity rates on grocery
sales tax rates under a base specification with year fixed effects, the base specification
augmented with county fixed effects, and a third specification that also adds time-varying
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control variables. The results in columns 1, 2 and 3 are all similar with point estimates of
0.707, 0.606 and 0.588, respectively. Under all specifications, the grocery tax is positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level. Our preferred specification reported in column
3, which includes the most comprehensive controls (county fixed effects plus a number of
factors identified in the literature), suggests that a one-percentage point increase in the
grocery tax rate is associated with a 0.588 percentage point increase in the obesity rate. In
contrast, the coefficient on the restaurant tax is a negative value (-0.158), though it is
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The results in columns 4, 5 and 6 present the results for diabetes rates. The point
estimates of the associations between grocery sales tax and the prevalence of diabetes are
0.400, 0.252 and 0.215, respectively. Under all specifications, the grocery tax is positive
and statistically significant at the 5% level. Our preferred specification reported in column
6 suggests that a one-percentage point increase in the grocery tax rate is associated with a
0.215 percentage point increase in the diabetes rate. Again, the coefficient on the restaurant
tax is negative (-0.127), though it is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
In Table 2.3 we assess the robustness of our results for both obesity and diabetes
rates using an alternative food tax measure—the grocery tax to restaurant tax ratio is used
as the main independent variable instead of the grocery tax. Results are consistent with
those reported in Table 2.2 and are statistically significant at the 5% level for specifications
including county fixed effects.
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2.5 Discussion
We find evidence that grocery taxes have an adverse effect on both obesity and
diabetes rates. Specifically, assuming our county fixed effects estimator is not biased by
time-varying omitted variables, then a one percentage point increase in grocery taxes
increases obesity and diabetes rates by 0.588 and 0.215 percentage points, respectively.
To put our results in context from a policy perspective, we calculate benefit-cost
ratios (BCRs) to summarize whether the health benefits associated with reducing the
grocery tax by one percentage point are likely to exceed the cost of foregone tax revenues
from their reduction. Table 2.4 reports the ratios and Appendix 2 shows the detailed steps
to obtain the ratios.
Our preferred estimates of annual expenditures (direct costs only) for treating
obesity and diabetes are $1,901 (Association, 2018). We also considered variations among
cost estimates; for example, a meta-analysis found that the annual medical expenditures
attributable to treating obesity for a person with the condition varies from $1,239 to $2,582
(Kornfield, Huang, Vera, & Emery, 2015). Therefore, in a sensitivity analysis we consider
low and high estimates for these figures, these results are also summarized in Table 2.4.
The top portion of Table 2.4 summarizes our estimates of health burdens associated
with grocery taxes. The aggregate U.S. health burden of grocery taxes in the year 2016 due
to medical expenditures on obesity and diabetes is calculated to be $5.86 billion (95% C.I.
is $1.81 billion to $10.30 billion).
The bottom portion of Table 2.4 summarizes the BCRs. The calculated BCRs for
obesity and diabetes using our preferred estimates of medical expenditures are 0.666 (95%
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C.I. is 0.324 to 1.008) and 1.23 (95% C.I. is 0.163 to 2.329), respectively. The BCR of
these two factors combined is 1.896. Similar to health burden analysis we also summarize
the results of our sensitivity analysis for the BCR. Based on the sensitivity analysis and
taking into account a range based on sampling variability of our regression output, our
lowest estimate of the combined BCR is 1.289 and the highest is 2.601.
Many states and local municipalities have recently considered changing their
grocery tax, such as West Virginia in 2017 (proposing an 8% new tax) and Utah in 2018
(proposing removing grocery taxes). States and counties that tax food need to understand
that this policy is associated with adverse health outcomes. Our preliminary results suggest
that officials in states that tax groceries should take a closer look at ways to lessen the
potential burden of such taxes as a way to improve health outcomes for the community.
Decreasing the grocery tax would reduce tax revenue, and government officials would need
to look at alternative revenue generating options if it lowered grocery taxes. Another option
to off-set the potential adverse effects of grocery taxes would be a tax credit, though it
would have to be sufficiently large to off-set the tax. Further, it is not clear how a lumpsum tax credit would affect the marginal responses to taxes we estimate in our analysis.
Furthermore, we find that the ratio of the grocery tax to the restaurant sales tax is
also positively associated with adverse health outcomes. In particular, a doubling of this
tax ratio is found to increase obesity and obesity rates by an average of 0.773 and 0.21
percentage point, respectively. This has policy implications that should be considered
especially by states and counties that are either considering levying a grocery tax or
eliminating it. It is possible the adverse health outcomes could be lessened if this relative
tax ratio were lowered in states with grocery taxes. For example, one option would be to
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consider a revenue neutral simultaneous decrease in the grocery tax and increase in the
restaurant (particularly fast-food establishments) tax as a way to lessen adverse health
outcomes.

2.6 Conclusion
Our county-level depiction of grocery taxes in the United States reflects the first
comprehensive dataset on state and county-level grocery taxes and shows a clear spatial
correlation between grocery taxes and nutrition-related health outcomes. The regression
results, which are based on data county fixed effects estimator, shows a strong statistical
relationship between grocery taxes and both obesity and diabetes. Several states and
counties are actively considering the levying or removal of grocery taxes. Our study design
is only one component of the costs (or benefits) of a grocery tax; nonetheless, the results
are thought-provoking and suggest the possibility of a large health burden from grocery
taxes and a benefit-cost ratio greater than one corresponding to reductions in the grocery
tax. Based on our findings using a novel panel dataset combining comprehensive countylevel grocery tax data with county-level health outcome measures, we recommend both
researchers and policy makers give further consideration to the removal of grocery taxes a
possible mechanism to improve health outcomes. Meanwhile, more evidence would be
required to pin down a mechanism through which grocery taxes may affect health
outcomes, for example, more evidence on the potential link through fruit and vegetable
consumption choices.
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Tables and Figures for Chapter 2
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of the Variables Used
Unit

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

Obesity rate (age-adjusted diagnosed)

%

30.419

4.84

10.7

47.6

Diabetes rate (age-adjusted diagnosed)

%

9.305

2.122

3.4

19.4

Total grocery sales tax rate

%

1.142

2.084

0.000

9.000

Total restaurant sales tax rate

%

6.036

1.686

0.000

9.933

0.340

0.328

0.093

1.000

Health Outcomes

Tax Variables

(1+Grocery Tax)/(1+Restaurant Tax)
Socioeconomic Variables
Grocery stores per capita

1/1000

0.221

0.14

0.017

1.701

Fast-food restaurants per capita

1/1000

0.616

0.198

0.044

1.964

Full-service restaurants per capita

1/1000

0.781

0.414

0.042

3.995

Cost per meal

$

2.775

0.306

1.956

5.113

White

0.857

0.145

0.093

0.991

Black

0.087

0.133

0.000

0.85

Female

0.502

0.016

0.366

0.553

Hispanic

0.085

0.12

0.004

0.957

Income per capita

1,000$ 39.014 10.899 18.768 199.241

Employees' share of total population

0.527

0.144

0.219

3.213

Share of bachelor’s degree or higher of
the 25-year- and-over population

%

21.983

9.291

5.967

72.867

Smoking rate

%

20.599

5.096

3.167

42.160

Drinking rate

%

15.331

4.947

1.6

35.933

Drug arrest rate

0.005

0.04

0.000

1.893

DUI

0.006

0.034

0.000

1.886

Counties: 1,858; Obs.: 9,779
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Table 2.2 Regression Results of Health Outcomes on Respective Grocery and Restaurant
Sales Taxes
Dependent variable: Obesity Prevalence (unit: %, mean: 30.419, S.D.: 4.840)
Diabetes Prevalence (unit: %, mean: 9.305, S.D.: 2.122)
Obesity
Diabetes
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total Grocery 0.707*** 0.636*** 0.588*** 0.400*** 0.252** 0.215**
Sales Tax Rate (%) (0.203)
(0.153)
(0.154)
(0.118) (0.108) (0.098)
0.369*
-0.147
-0.158
0.290***
-0.134
-0.127
Total Restaurant
Sales Tax Rate (%) (0.194)
(0.139)
(0.127)
(0.096) (0.111) (0.101)
Observations
9,779
9,779
9,779
9,779
9,779
9,779
R-squared
0.129
0.909
0.910
0.227
0.927
0.928
Period FE
(m_period = 6)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
County FE
(m_county =
Y
Y
1,858)
Controls
Y
Y
Y
Y
Note: The results are presented in six columns from one to six. Standard errors are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table 2.3 Regression Results of Health Outcomes on Grocery to Restaurant Sales Taxes
Ratio
Dependent variable: Obesity Prevalence (unit: %, mean: 30.419, S.D.: 4.840)
Diabetes Prevalence (unit: %, mean: 9.305, S.D.: 2.122)
Obesity
Diabetes
1
2
3
4
5
6
2.639
5.144*** 4.760*** 1.498
1.603*** 1.296**
Tax Ratio
(1.721) (1.263)
(1.169)
(1.026) (0.594)
(0.571)
Observations
9,779
9,779
9,779
9,779
9,779
9,779
R-squared
0.036
0.909
0.910
0.028
0.927
0.928
Period FE (m_period =
6)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
County FE (m_county =
1,858)
Y
Y
Controls
Y
Y
Y
Y
Note: The results are presented in six columns from one to six. Standard errors are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. We calculate Tax Ratio as:
(1+Grocery Tax) / (1+Restaurant Tax).
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Table 2.4 Summary of Aggregate U.S. Health Burdens and Benefit-Cost Ratios with
Sensitivity Analysis
1
2
3
Obesity
Diabetes
Total
Aggregate U.S. health
burdens (billions of USD)
Low estimate
1.34
2.64
3.98
(0.65, 2.03)
(0.56, 5.00)
(1.21, 7.03)
Preferred estimate
2.06
3.8
5.86
(1.00, 3.11)
(0.81, 7.19)
(1.81, 10.30)
High Estimate
2.79
5.24
8.03
(1.36, 4.23)
(1.11, 9.92)
(2.47, 14.15)
Benefit-cost ratios
(health benefits / cost of
reduced tax revenue)
Low estimate
0.434
0.855
1.289
(0.211, 0.657)
(0.091, 1.619)
(0.302, 2.276)
Preferred estimate
0.666
1.23
1.896
(0.324, 1.008)
(0.163, 2.329)
(0.487, 3.337)
High Estimate
0.905
1.696
2.601
(0.440, 1.369)
(0.181, 3.212)
(0.621, 4.581)
Note: The results are presented in three columns from one to three. In parentheses we
report the 95% confidence interval derived from the sampling variability of the regression
coefficients reported in columns (3) and (6) of Table 2.2.
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Year

Period

2009
2010

Period 1
Counties with a tax change:
36 Counties w/o tax
change: 1,444

2011

Period 2
Counties with a tax change:
43 Counties w/o tax
change: 1,673

2012
2013

Period 4
Counties with a tax change:
36
Counties w/o tax
change: 1,581

2014

Period 5
Counties with a tax change:
43 Counties w/o tax
change: 1,599

2015
2016

Figure 2.1 Study Design
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Period 3
Counties with a tax change:
8 Counties w/o tax
change: 1,695

Period 6
Counties with a tax change:
8 Counties w/o tax
change: 1,613

Figure 2.2 U.S. Grocery Sales Tax Distribution for the Year of 2016
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Average obesity and diabetes rates (2009 to 2016)
34
33

Grocery tax counties

32
31
30

No grocery tax counties

29
Grocery tax counties

12

No grocery tax counties

10

11
9
20
16

20
15

20
14

20
13

20
12

20
11

20
10

20
09

8

Average Diabetes Rate (%)

Average Obesity Rate (%)

by county-level grocery tax status

Year

Figure 2.3 Average Obesity and Diabetes Rates by Grocery Sales Taxes
Sources: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and authors’ own data collection.
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CHAPTER 3. CAUSAL IMPACT OF GROCERY SALES TAXES ON WEIGHT OUTCOME:
EVIDENCE FROM THE PSID PANEL
3.1 Introduction
Grocery sales taxes exist in 16 states in the U.S., but their causal impacts on obesity remain
unknown. Recently, there has been a trend of exempting or decreasing grocery sales tax
rates in many states and counties to achieve more progressive tax systems. Although the
major purpose of decreasing grocery sales taxes is not to prevent obesity, such food tax
policy may unexpectedly affect people’s food choice and subsequent body weight.
As a matter of fact, taxing food is not a novel policy instrument in local
governments’ tool kit to control the increasing food-related health risks. Like any other
food and beverage taxes, grocery sales taxes affect obesity through guiding people’s food
consumption behaviour (Powell & Chriqui, 2011). If grocery sales tax rates decrease, the
relative price of grocery food to restaurant food is lower. With people switching to grocery
food due to this substitution effect, healthier diets likely follow, and the obesity issue is
therefore mitigated. Unlike other food and beverage taxes which aims on limited specific
types of items, grocery sales taxes have a larger tax base so that the decline of grocery taxes
is expected to have a larger impact on reducing obesity. In other words, if the taxes
increase, it can in turn aggravate prevalence of obesity and diabetes (L. Wang, Zheng,
Buck, Dong, & Kaiser, 2021).
It seems that the reduction of grocery sales taxes can effectively tackle the obesity
issue according to the economic intuition above. In reality, the health impact of the taxes
may not be as noticeable as expected. First, food consumption may not be as sensitive as
the price changes. As a review summarizes, price elasticities of most groceries are less than

one: the price elasticities of fruits and vegetables are -0.70 and -0.59, which indicates that
groceries are inelastic (Andreyeva, Long, & Brownell, 2010). Second, it is pointed out by
some researchers that taxes are not salient to some consumers (Chetty, Looney, & Kroft,
2009; Zheng, McLaughlin, & Kaiser, 2012). If consumers are not able to realize tax
changes, taxes then would not be effective in changing consumers’ grocery consumption,
let alone improving diets and affecting body weight outcomes. Third, it takes tax policies
a long time to affect consumers’ body weight (Goldman, Lakdawalla, & Zheng, 2009). If
the study period is too short for consumers’ health to be affected, significant health impacts
of grocery sales taxes cannot be found. Last but not least, genetics, gender, race and income
contributed to heterogeneous health impacts, and some researchers found black, female
and low-income populations are more sensitive to food taxes (Goryakin, Monsivais, &
Suhrcke, 2017; Yaniv, Rosin, & Tobol, 2009). As a result, if the impacts are estimated
without considering those demographic and income variables, the estimated impacts may
be insignificant.
Considering the heterogeneous effects, the lower-socioeconomic status (SES)
population is expected to suffer the most from incretion of grocery taxes if no other food
subsidies are implemented. The substitution effect is expected to be more significant for
lower-SES population, leading to more severe obesity problem with the increase of grocery
sales taxes. As grocery sales taxes become relatively expensive due to the tax addition, the
primary option to shift to is fast restaurant food (French, 2003) because fast restaurant food
is more easily accessible (Powell et al., 2007; Rydell et al., 2008) and affordable (Khan et
al., 2012) than groceries and other restaurant food for the lower-SES population. But there
are large health costs of consuming fast restaurant food from a long-term perspective. It
28

can directly and indirectly cause obesity, diabetes, and other chronic cardiovascular
diseases if fast food is regularly consumed (Chou et al., 2004). However, Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) provides a protection shelter for its participants to
offset the tax impact (Zheng et al., 2021) since the tax is exempted for the grocery
consumption covered by SNAP. Therefore, the lower-SES population is likely to suffer the
most from grocery taxes if without food subsidies. However, taking SNAP into
consideration, we are not certain which income-category family suffer the most.
In this essay, therefore, we aim to demonstrate whether grocery sales taxes make
significant impacts on body weight outcomes. Through merging the county-level grocery
tax data with the individual longitudinal data from Panel Study Income Dynamics (PSID),
we explore a fixed effect model to estimate the causal impact of grocery sales taxes on
family food expenditures and individual BMI. Additionally, we conduct the analysis of
heterogeneous effects by income category and obesity level to identify the policy impacts
on different individuals and families. We find that a ten point-percentage increase in
grocery sales rate leads to a rise of BMI by 0.61 (which roughly translates to a body weight
gain of 1.68kg). The results are more significant for the overweight population whose BMI
is greater than 25 but smaller than 30. We do not find significant results towards different
income populations.
There are two main contributions of this essay. This is the first paper, to my
knowledge, trying to estimate the causal impact of grocery sales taxes on people’s body
weight outcome. Second, based on the empirical evidence, we distinguish the policy
differences between grocery sales taxes and sin taxes and provide policy suggestions to
local governments.
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The rest of the essay is arranged in the following way. In the second section, we
review studies on all types of food and beverage taxes and summarize the impact of the
taxes on corresponding food and beverage consumption and obesity. In the third section,
we introduce the econometric model and the data. We then present the empirical results in
the fourth section. In the last section, we conclude and discuss the policy implications of
the study.

3.2 Literature Review
The development of how food and beverage taxes affect body weight outcome are
shown in Figure 3.1. There are two major food and beverage taxes, grocery sales taxes and
sin taxes. Sin taxes, including fat taxes and soda taxes, have been investigated in numerous
studies, while the literature on grocery sales taxes is scarce. These two taxes affect body
weight outcome through similar paths. Both taxes shift prices and affect consumption of
food and beverages, ultimately affecting body weight (Powell & Chaloupka, 2009).
3.2.1 Grocery Sales Taxes
There is little literature on how grocery sales taxes affect food and beverage
consumption and obesity, probably because of the lack of a ready dataset recording the
county-level grocery taxes and tax changes. To our knowledge, there is only one study that
directly reported how grocery tax changes in Kansas reshaped consumer grocery demand,
and finally concluded that food sales are sensitive to grocery sales tax changes
(Srithongrung, 2017). In this study, only one state is considered, and the time period of tax
change being investigated was quite short, from 2012 to 2013. Recently, a few researchers
have exploited nation-wide county-level grocery tax variations and published a series of
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results of grocery tax impacts. By employing newly collected grocery tax data, they found
that grocery sales taxes can induce people to eat out (Zheng, Dong, Burney, & Kaiser,
2019a), aggravate food insecurity among the Non-SNAP lower-SES population (N. L.
Wilson, Zheng, Burney, & Kaiser, 2016a), and promote obesity, which burdens public
health costs (L. Wang et al., 2021). Nevertheless, these three studies either employ cross
sectional individual survey data (N. L. Wilson, Zheng, Burney, & Kaiser, 2016b; Zheng et
al., 2019a) or county-level aggregate data (L. Wang et al., 2021). There have been no
studies that identify the causal impact of grocery sales taxes by employing individual panel
data. Our interest using PSID data to tackle this issue stems partly from this observation.
3.2.2 Sin Taxes of Food and Beverages
Although there is not a federal food and beverage tax in the U.S., levels of local
governments have levied food and beverage taxes to collect extra tax revenue since the end
of the Great Depression (Creighton, 2010). Sin taxes are usually levied on addictive
products, such as tobacco and alcohol, to overcome the health externalities. Nowadays,
most food and beverage taxes, except grocery sales taxes, have been adopted as a type of
“sin tax” by local governments (Allcott, Lockwood, & Taubinsky, 2019). The principle
behind the “sin tax” is that some food and beverages, usually calorie-condensed, are
unhealthy, and consuming such food becomes a sin. The purpose of the “sin taxes” is to
control the consumption of unhealthy food and/or beverages, and therefore to prevent
negative health outcomes, like obesity, and reduce overwhelming health costs. As “sin
taxes” are levied in more and more places, increasing studies are promoted to examine the
effects of food and beverage taxes on the food and beverage consumption, as well as weight
outcomes.
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One of the most well-known “sin taxes” is the “fat tax", which was first introduced
by Denmark in 2011 but was quickly abandoned in 2012 (Bødker, Pisinger, Toft, &
Jørgensen, 2015). The Demark “fax tax” policy is a systematic tax reform imposing taxes
on food that contains more saturated fat. The tax largely increased the prices of food such
as butter, butter blends, margarine and oil. As a result, the estimated consumption of fat
sharply shrunk by an estimated 41.8g/week (Jensen & Smed, 2013). However, since the
implemented period is short, no significant health impacts were found from the Danish “fat
tax” policy.
Inspired by the Danish “fat tax”, researchers from other European Union countries
estimated demand system models to calculate the price, consumption and health effects of
a hypothesized “fat tax”. For example, employing Norway consumer expenditure surveys
of statistics, researchers found people in Norway limited their purchases of the taxed items,
resulting in a small body weight change (Gustavsen & Rickertsen, 2013). In contrast,
through a simulation, French researchers concluded that the “fat taxes” have few impacts
on building healthy diets for French households because of the inelasticity of fat intake in
France (Allais, Bertail, & Nichèle, 2020). Since the taxed items are different from country
to country, whether fat taxes are effective is debatable depending on different studies. To
conclude, most researchers found that simulated “fat taxes” can reduce the consumption of
the taxed food, but the health effect is expected to be small because of the inelasticity of
food consumption (Abdus & Cawley, 2008; Tiffin & Arnoult, 2011). Researchers agreed
that a carefully designed food tax, usually a “fat tax” can modify people’s eating habits.
Also, those meaningful changes in food consumption can reduce cardiovascular disease
and prevent deaths. However, the impacts are modest and some are even insignificant
32

(Mhurchu et al., 2015; Mytton, Gray, Rayner, & Rutter, 2007). So far, there has been no
empirical evidence employing real survey data about the impact of fat taxes on improving
health, including whether fat taxes can reduce obesity and how much the impact could be.
Another typical “sin tax” that is frequently adopted in the U.S. is the soda tax. There
is more empirical evidence of this tax because soda taxes have been adopted in over twothirds of all states and some cities. Some studies directly estimate how the soda tax affects
body weight outcome in reduced-form equations using self-reported body weight data from
national cross-sectional surveys. For example, by employing the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System (BRFSS) survey data, a group of researchers found that state-level
soda taxes have a significant but small impact on weight loss for adults (J. M. Fletcher, D.
Frisvold, & N. Tefft, 2010a). The weight-reduction impact disappears when they apply
similar methods investigating the samples of children and adolescents (J. M. Fletcher, D.
Frisvold, & N. Tefft, 2010b) because those populations can easily substitute other highcalorie drinks (Fletcher et al., 2010c). Other researchers employed scanner data to estimate
demand systems, and through calibrating the tax with the demand system, they estimated
how soda taxes reduced soda price and consumption (Zheng & Kaiser, 2008). Based on the
consumption reduction, they calculated the declined calorie intake and then predict the
transmission into weight loss (Dharmasena & Capps Jr, 2012; Zhen, Finkelstein,
Nonnemaker, Karns, & Todd, 2014). Most of these studies confirmed the price and
consumption effect of soda taxes (Paarlberg, Mozaffarian, & Micha, 2017; Teng et al.,
2019). The predicted weight-loss impact is usually larger than the direct estimation using
reduced form, even when controlling the substitution to non-taxed beverages (Finkelstein
et al., 2013).
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After reviewing the literature, we find the causal impact of grocery taxes on health
outcomes is still not clear with empirical evidence, and there has been no study
investigating this impact. The goal of our research is to fill this gap.

3.3 Econometric Model
We use a fixed-effect model to estimate the causal impact of how grocery sales
taxes affect individual body weight outcome (BMI) and family food expenditures. For the
impact on individual BMI, the econometric identification can be expressed using the
equation:
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝜽𝜽𝒁𝒁𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐 + 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡 +
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (3.8),

where 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the body mass index of individual 𝑖𝑖 residented at county 𝑐𝑐 in year 𝑡𝑡.

𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 are the main independent variables representing

total grocery sales tax rate and total restaurant sales rate of county 𝑐𝑐 in year 𝑡𝑡. 𝒁𝒁𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is a

vector including individual-level demographic characteristics, namely age, gender, race,
marital status, whether has kids, education years, types of working industry, family income,

participation in SNAP, time spent in housework, cigarette smoking habit, alcohol drinking
habit and frequency of physical activity. 𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐 is the county-fixed effect controlling for the

time-invariant unobserved county variables, while 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 is the year-fixed effect controlling
for the annual time shock. 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐 𝑡𝑡 represents a time trend at county-level, and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an error
term. In order to obtain correct and robust standard errors, standard errors are clustered at
county-level.
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Our main parameter, 𝛽𝛽1 , implies how changes of the county-level total grocery

sales tax can affect individual BMI on average holding other variables constant. If 𝛽𝛽1 is

significantly positive, it shows that imposing grocery sales tax induces body-weight gain,

while if the parameter is significantly negative, it shows that grocery sales taxes can
improve obesity.
Although grocery sales tax is generally regarded exogenous to the local health
status, we still add covariates, year-fixed effects, county-fixed effects and time trend by
counties to identify a more accurate estimator. Aside from covariate individual
demographics, there are unobserved factors that are associated with both grocery taxes and
weight outcomes. Year-fixed effects are added to account for the shocks that take place in
specific years. We also fix county effects in the regression to control for the variations
across counties. By adding a year trend by county, we expect to avoid spurious regression
because the average obesity is increasing during the nine years as shown in Chapter 2. In a
nutshell, these selections on the observable and unobservable factors mitigate the potential
omitted variable issues and unobserved endogeneity problems, providing a feasible way to
identify unbiased health impacts of the grocery sales taxes on body weight outcomes.
We also clustered the standard error of the estimator at county level (which is at the
policy implementation level) to obtain an accurate statistical inference (Cameron & Miller,
2015). There is a high possibility that the residuals are correlated within counties. For
example, the unexplained part of the individual body weight is correlated with other
individual’s body weights in the same county for they may have similar environment and
culture. Thus, we employ clustered standard error instead of classic standard error to avoid
the overstated estimator precision.
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3.4 Data
We obtain the individual-level data and family-level data from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a longitudinal family survey conducted by
University of Michigan. It mainly asks questions about income and expenditure of each
family and family members. Further, the survey also contains food and health related
questions and self-reported individual weight and height (Sastry, Fomby, & McGonagle,
2018). The entire PSID dataset contains more than 18,000 individuals in over 5,000
households. During our research period from 2006 to 2017, the survey is conducted six
times, namely in 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017, and we only include adult
samples in our research. The weight outcome variables are separated according to head and
wife from PSID Main Family Data. Then the weight outcome data is merged with the
control variables which are obtained from the PSID Individual Data. At last, we merge the
PSID data with the grocery sales tax data based on the county-level FIPS code. The FIPS
codes of PSID families are obtained from the PSID restricted Geographic Information data.
The grocery tax data is uniquely assembled, including state-level grocery taxes and countylevel grocery taxes from 2006 to 2017. The state-level grocery data is obtained from
Bridging the Gap, while the county-level grocery taxes are collected from state
Departments of Revenue and Tax-Rates.org. Totally, 3,101 counties are covered in the tax
dataset.
In our final merged dataset, there are 19,432 individuals from 13,949 families. In
particular, there are 9,145 men and 10,287 women who are resident in 1,468 counties from
51 states. In total, the dataset includes 78,872 observations. To merge with our countylevel grocery sales tax data, we only keep individuals and families who are residents in
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counties in the merged dataset and delete the individuals and families who are resident in
cities. We also delete the observations who refuse to report/don’t know their weights and
heights. We calculate the BMI for each observation using the formular as:
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 =

𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑡𝑡
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑡𝑡 2

(3.9),

where the unit of the weight is kilogram, while the unit of the height is meter. Table 3.1
presents the summary statistics (mean) of main variables.

3.5 Results
3.5.1 Main Results
Table 3.2 reports the impacts of grocery sales taxes on body weight outcomes.
Based on Equation (3.8), the result from column (1) is estimated without any controlled
variables while column (2) result is estimated with individual-level covariates. The
dependent variables change to body weight measured by kilogram is shown in the results
from the last two columns. Column (3) is estimated without individual-level covariates,
while column (4) is estimated with the same covariates as column (2). All the results are
estimated with county-fixed effects, year-fixed effects, and county by year trend.
Comparing the first two columns, the sign and magnitude of estimates are similar
indicating that the impact of grocery sales taxes on BMI is relatively stable. Although the
estimate from column (1) is not significant, the standard error is relatively small. With the
individual demographic controlled, the estimate become significant at 10% significance
level. The estimate of grocery tax on BMI is 0.061, implying that if the grocery sales tax
increases by one percentage point, individual BMI on average increases by 0.061, holding
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other factors constant. If we use body weight to measure the weight gain caused by grocery
taxes, a one percentage point increase in grocery taxes leads to a gain of 0.168 kg weight
for an average individual. To sum up, the estimates of interest are consistent with what we
anticipate, demonstrating that increased grocery sales taxes cause individual to gain weight.
3.5.2 Heterogeneous Impacts
We apply the same estimation method among the population with different income, but we
do not find grocery sales taxes have significant heterogeneous impacts. However, we find
the taxes have more significant impact on the overweight population. The overweight
population contains individuals whose BMI is less than (<) 30 but greater than (>=) 25
(Flegal, Carroll, Kuczmarski, & Johnson, 1998). All the estimates of this sampled
population are significant at 5% significance level which are stronger than the entire
sampled population (Table 3.3), implicating that this population is more likely to be
affected by the grocery tax changes. In addition, if we only select individuals from the
taxed states and counties, the magnitude of the tax impact becomes larger (Table 3.4), but
the significance does not change.

3.6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this article, we exam the causal impacts of grocery sales tax on body weight
outcomes and find significant results. It is estimated that an additional ten percentage point
increase in grocery sales rate leads to the rise of BMI by 0.61 in our preferred model. Using
body weight measured by kilogram, this translates to a 1.68 kg increase in body weight on
average. If we only focus on families and individuals from the taxed states and counties,
the impacts are greater. The impact on BMI increased to 0.91 and that on body weight
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increased to 2.69 kg, and the estimates are more significant for the overweight population.
Given the high medical costs of obesity, whether it is worthy to levy sales taxes on grocery
became a challenging question for those states and counties with grocery sale taxes.
It is essential to compare grocery sales taxes and sin taxes. On one hand, both taxes
are raised by local governments instead of federal governments, thus the two types of taxes
have local and limited impact on the residents. Both taxes are food taxes, which affect
obesity through changing the relative prices of food and/or beverage. However, the two
taxes are different in root. Sin taxes are born to tackle the negative health outcomes by
controlling certain food and/or beverage consumption; while grocery taxes are levied on
all groceries, aiming to generate more tax revenue. Sin taxes are levied on unhealthy
groceries like soda and sweets, while grocery sales taxes are levied on grocery food (food
at home), which is considered healthier as compared to restaurant food (food away from
home). Thus, if the government would like to employ tax instruments to offset the medical
costs of obesity, it should impose sin taxes but exempt groceries. It is interesting to compare
the impacts of levying soda taxes and exempting grocery sales taxes on the U.S. adult since
the two food and beverage taxes have similar mechanism affecting obesity. According to
the most optimistic estimation in literature, imposing a 20% soda tax reduces an average
individual’s body weight by 0.7-1.2 kg every year (Dharmasena & Capps Jr, 2012), while
a similar amount of body weight reduction can also be achieved with decreasing grocery
sales taxes by 4.2-7.1 point percentage.
Since our dataset does not include municipal tax rates, ignoring municipal other
level grocery tax rates may cause our estimates biased due to the omitted variable bias
(OVB). If increasing municipal tax rates can also cause obesity, and municipal tax rates
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are positively related with county grocery sales tax rates. Then our estimates are
overestimated. Additionally, the investigation does not consider the tax rebates. However,
there are only three states that allow refunding grocery sales taxes to low-income, disabled,
old and pregnant populations. We are not able to obtain information about these
populations. Omitting the refunding populations can also slightly biased our estimates.
While this is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, to empirically examine
the causal impacts of grocery sales tax on body weight gain using individual longitudinal
data, we recognize that it is only a first step towards full identification. To get a full picture
of the health impacts of grocery sales tax, it is necessary to test the causal link on how
grocery sales taxes affect food consumption patterns, followed by how the changes in food
consumption patterns affect consumers’ health. As such, scanner data that can track
individual food consumption behavior and health outcomes could be helpful for fully
identifying the impacts of grocery sales tax.
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Tables and Figures for Chapter 3
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics (Mean)
Variable
Unit
BMI
NA
Weight
Kg
Grocery Tax
%
Restaurant Tax
%
Age
Years
White
%
Hispanic
%
Black
%
Married
%
Have Kid
%
Family Income
$
Education Years
Years
SNAP
%
HouseWork
Hours per Week
Cigrettes Per Day
Number
Drinking Alcohol
%
Physical Activity
Hours per Week
Numbers of
Observations
N
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All
27.494
82.150
1.309
6.466
45.238
0.502
0.027
0.177
0.673
0.445
78042.63
15.151
0.151
11.885
3.788
0.614
2.149

Men
27.703
90.553
1.27
6.433
45.307
0.563
0.029
0.183
0.758
0.413
83954.6
15.208
0.112
8.183
5.028
0.685
2.43

Women
27.323
75.281
1.34
6.493
45.181
0.452
0.247
0.173
0.604
0.471
73216.3
15.104
0.183
14.92
2.77
0.555
1.92

78,872

35,449

43,423

19,432

9,145

10,287

Table 3.2 Impacts of Grocery Sales Taxes on BMI and Body Weight
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

VARIABLES

BMI

BMI

Weight

Weight

Grocery Tax

0.052

0.061*

0.189*

0.168*

(0.033)

(0.032)

(0.102)

(0.095)

-0.051

-0.076*

0.001

-0.157

(0.044)

(0.043)

(0.136)

(0.130)

Controls

N

Y

N

Y

County FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Year FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Time Trend

Y

Y

Y

Y

Observations

78,786

77,769

78,786

77,769

R-squared

0.142

0.164

0.151

0.27

Restaurant Tax

Note: The estimated results are shown in four columns from column (1) to column (4).
Column (1) and (3) do not contain control variables. The dependent variable in column (1)
and (2) are BMI, and the dependent variable in column (3) and (4) are Weight by kilogram.
Standard errors are clustered at county-level in paratheses; * denotes 10% significance.

Table 3.3 Impacts of Grocery Sales Taxes on Weight Outcomes for the Over -Weight
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
VARIABLES
BMI
BMI
Weight
Weight
Grocery Tax
Restaurant Tax
Controls
County FE
Year FE
Time Trend

0.048**
(0.021)
-0.002
(0.026)

0.051**
(0.021)
-0.004
(0.026)

0.143**
(0.067)
-0.035
(0.079)

0.150**
(0.067)
-0.04
(0.078)

N
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

N
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

Observations
26,598
26,230
26,598
26,230
R-squared
0.142
0.148
0.868
0.868
Note: The estimated results are shown in four columns from column (1) to column (4).
Column (1) and (3) do not contain control variables. The dependent variable in column
(1) and (2) are BMI, and the dependent variable in column (3) and (4) are Weight by
kilogram. Standard errors are clustered at county-level in paratheses; ** denotes 5%
significance.
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Table 3.4 Impacts of Grocery Sales Taxes on Weight Outcomes (Taxed County Sample)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
VARIABLES
BMI
BMI
Weight
Weight
Grocery Tax
Restaurant Tax
Controls
County FE
Year FE
Time Trend

0.079
(0.053)
-0.075
(0.084)

0.091*
(0.054)
-0.091
(0.083)

0.241*
(0.145)
-0.192
(0.226)

0.269*
(0.144)
-0.245
(0.224)

N
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

N
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

Observations
27,460
27,063
27,460
27,063
R-squared
0.166
0.184
0.319
0.334
Note: The estimated results are shown in four columns from column (1) to column (4).
Column (1) and (3) do not contain control variables. The dependent variable in column
(1) and (2) are BMI, and the dependent variable in column (3) and (4) are Weight by
kilogram. Standard errors are clustered at county-level in paratheses; * denotes 10%
significance.
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Notes: FAH represents food at home, while FAFH represents food away from home.
Figure 3.1 Literature of How Food Taxes Affect Body Weight Outcomes
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CHAPTER 4. THE DIVERSITY OF GROCERY SALES TAX RATES IN THE U.S.: EVIDENCE
FROM MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNMENT INTERACTION
4.1 Introduction
Groceries are taxed at diverse rates across the U.S. In some places, grocery sales
taxes are exempted at the state and/or county level, while in other places, the tax rate can
be as high as 9%, including the state tax rate and county tax rate. The divergent tax rates
lead to continual public discussions and political proposals on cutting and even repealing
the grocery sales taxes in the 16 with-tax states every year. In this essay, we discuss the
causes of diverse grocery tax rates in a framework of local tax competition by considering
the horizontal, vertical and diagonal tax effects at the state and county level.
From a historical perspective, states followed a spatial pattern exempting state-level
sales taxes on groceries, which occurred successively in three waves. The first wave of the
tax exemption started in the Great Depression of the 1930s, when general sales taxes were
firstly introduced, and grocery foods were excluded from being taxed. Those states in the
first wave are California, Texas, and most northeastern states. The second wave of
exempting grocery sales taxes was triggered by Iowa in the early 1970s, followed by other
middle eastern states including Michigan, Washington D.C., Indiana, Kentucky and North
Dakota over the 1980s. During the second wave, some western states, including
Washington, Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, and Nebraska, exempted their taxes as well. The
last wave of grocery sales tax exemptions happened at the start of the third millennium,
when more and more southern states, such as Georgia, Louisiana, North and South
Carolina, New Mexico and West Virginia, tarted to exempt grocery sales taxes (Figure
4.1).
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More recently, from 2006 to 2017, the grocery tax rates at state level have been
decreasing on average, according to the data we collected. Among the seven states that
changed the tax during those twelve years, six states dropped the state grocery tax rates,
while Kansas is the only one state that slightly increased its state grocery tax rates from
5.3% in 2006 to 6.5% in 2017 (Figure 4.1). In particular, Wyoming, South Carolina and
West Virginia consecutively exempted the grocery taxes during the study period. Countylevel grocery tax rates also frequently change. More than 100 counties changed grocery
sales tax rates over 300 times during the research period. However, contradictory to the
decreasing state-level grocery tax rates, county-level grocery tax rates have been
increasing. The average county-level grocery tax rate increased by 0.4-point percentage
between 2006 and 2017. It is also noticeable that even in some states, such as Georgia,
Louisiana and North Carolina, where state-level grocery taxes are exempted, there are still
considerable amount of county-level grocery taxes.
The tax policy is so divergent from state to state, from county to county, and
between states and counties that the cause of grocery tax rate changes becomes an
intriguing phenomenon. In this article, in order to explore the causes of grocery sales tax
changes, we consider spatial externalities of grocery tax rates and study the state-county
and county-county tax policy interaction patterns under a Stackelberg tax competition
model. Derivatized from the model, we obtain three propositions. County-level grocery tax
rates are affected by their domestic states’ grocery tax rates (the vertical-effect
proposition), the neighboring counties’ grocery tax rates (the horizontal-effect proposition)
and the neighboring states’ grocery tax rates (the diagonal-effect proposition) (Agrawal,
2016). In addition, by employing the newly assembled twelve-year data of state and county
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grocery tax rates, this essay also empirically examines the three propositions using a spatial
autoregressive model.
Our study contributes to the tax and food inequality literature, as well as practical
policy making in broad ways. First, it is the first study, to our knowledge, that explains
patterns and reasons for the changes of county-level grocery sales tax rates. Second, we
also expand state-county interaction on the grocery sales tax rate by allowing the diagonal
interaction where counties’ grocery tax rates are affected also by neighboring states’ tax
rates. There are theories about state-county federalism, but the empirical evidence is rare
considering nation-wide counties and a more than ten-year study period. In this study, we
investigate not only the horizontal competition, but also vertical and diagonal interaction
between upper-tier governments (states) and lower-tier governments (counties) nationally
from a decade-long perspective. Third, we first use a Stackelberg game model to mimic
the tax competition between the two-level governments. In our model, since states are
upper-tier governments, they are the tax leaders in the game, while counties, as the lowertier governments, usually follow the state leaders setting their tax rates. Compared to the
simultaneous gaming between the two-level governments, our model is more practical and
closer to reality. Finally, it is well acknowledged that local governments compete for major
tax categories such as property tax, income tax and general sales tax, but there is limited
research examining whether governments also compete on other local specific tax
categories, such as grocery sales taxes. As more and more local governments explore food
and beverage taxes as policy instruments, our study fills this gap by providing evidence
that local governments tend to interact with their upper-level governments and neighboring
governments competing on grocery sales tax rates.
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The rest of the essay is organized in the following way. The next section reviews
previous research on grocery sales taxes and the tax competition. The third section presents
a theoretical approach to how states and counties set optimal tax rates in a Stackelberg
gaming model. The subsequent sections illustrate the data and classifications, followed by
the empirical strategies and econometric method. Then, we present and analyze the results
in the sixth section. Finally, we summarize and discuss the policy implication in the last
section.

4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Grocery Sales Taxes
Grocery sales taxes have impacted people’s lifestyle and even the society in
multiple ways. On the one hand, the taxes imposing on food broadly influence consumer
behaviors related to food. First, the substitution effect of the grocery sales taxes influenced
public eating habits. Levying taxes on groceries makes grocery foods more expensive than
restaurant food so that more people are likely to eat away from home. As a result, restaurant
food expenditure grows while grocery food expenditure drops, and such substitution exists
in families across all income levels (Zheng, Dong, Burney, & Kaiser, 2019). This effect is
fully discussed in the previous two essays and can lead to severe problems on public health.
Second, grocery sales taxes are extra expenses added on the original food prices, which
ultimately raised food expenditures and aggravated food insecurity due to the shrinking
food budget among the low-SEC families. Although the tax does not apply to purchases
using SNAP, it largely increased the possibility of being insecure for the low-income but
non-participating SNAP households (N. L. Wilson, Zheng, Burney, & Kaiser, 2017).
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Third, grocery sales taxes directly increase cross-border grocery shopping. A cohort of
studies reported that when 46 counties in West Virginia changed their county-level grocery
sales taxes during 1979-1984, consumers travelled from places of higher grocery sales
taxes to the close-by places of lower grocery sales taxes to shop for groceries (Walsh &
Jones, 1988). The cross-border shopping boosted again in West Virginia when the state
started to reduce and finally exempt its state-level grocery sales taxes gradually in the
1990s (Tosun & Skidmore, 2007).
On the other hand, the grocery sales taxes may introduce a profound influence on
public health and other social outcomes. Since grocery sales taxes can change and guide
consumers’ eating behavior, the public health outcomes are subsequently affected by the
tax (Cawley & Ruhm, 2011). Besides the evidence provided in the previous two essays of
this dissertation, food and beverage taxes are frequently correlated with obesity issues
(Cawley, 2015). Furthermore, grocery sales taxes can also lead to other social problems.
Researchers found that grocery sales taxes cause unemployment in the food and beverage
industries, especially among young and female workers (Greenhalgh‐Stanley, Rohlin, &
Thompson, 2018).
While the consequences of grocery sales taxes have been investigated by a range
of researchers, the causes of grocery sales taxes have never been thoroughly discussed.
There are limited academic discussions on why grocery sales tax changes, even though
over 100 counties changed grocery sales tax rates more than 300 times during the past
decade.
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4.2.2 Tax Competition Theory
It is straight-forward to attribute the tax-exemption to a tax competition model,
where governments compete with each other for a lower sales tax rate. This is supported
by the spatial tax competition theory (Agrawal, Hoyt, & Wilson; J. D. Wilson, 1999). As
is assumed in the theory, the consumers are mobile for tax arbitrage to maximize their
utility (Mintz & Tulkens, 1986), so local governments from the same tier compete
horizontally, choosing the optimal taxes in order to maximize their government revenue
(Kanbur & Keen, 1993). In the Nash equilibrium of the horizontal competition, an increase
of commodity tax in a high-tax region encourages its residents to cross the region border
to shop in the nearby low-tax regions if the marginal revenue of the shopping trip exceed
the marginal transportation costs (Ohsawa, 1999). As a result, the competing governments
take turns offering as low as possible sales tax rates in the sales tax competition, not only
to encourage their residential consumers to consume at their own region, but also to attract
more consumers from other regions (Y.-Q. Wang, 1999). In a nutshell, the competition
always leads to declining tax rates for all the competing regions (Haufler, 1998), although
only the governments with lower sales tax rates are capable of enlarging their sales tax
revenue (Braid, 2000).
The tax exemption for groceries become more complicated considering the vertical
externalities where different levels of regional governments jointly compete for the same
sales tax bases (Esteller-Moré & Solé-Ollé, 2001). In a non-cooperative equilibrium, the
vertical externalities can adversely balance the excessively low tax rates caused by the
horizontal competitions (M. Keen & Kotsogiannis, 2003; M. J. Keen & Kotsogiannis,
2004), and sometimes the vertical externalities can even dominate the competition,
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resulting in excessively high local tax rates (M. J. Keen & Kotsogiannis, 2002). Currently,
counties adopting Home-Rule have more flexibility to impose local sales taxes within their
regions in the U.S. (Veuger, Shoag, & Tuttle, 2019), which promotes the vertical
interactions on sales tax rates (Burge & Rogers, 2011). However, the upper-level
governments gain the advantage over the lower-level governments in the frame of
federalism (Lucas, 2004), and thus, a state usually plays as a tax policy leader followed by
its counties in the state-county sales tax interaction. This is especially true in the regions
governed by Dillon Rule (Russell & Bostrom, 2016), where counties obtain the authority
to levy taxes from their states, which leads those counties to keep the same policy pattern
as their states. Furthermore, some recent literature also found that the sales taxation of a
lower-tier region is also positively influenced by the tax rates of its neighboring upper-tier
governments and the distances to the region border (Agrawal, 2016), mixing the vertical
externalities with the horizontal externalities(Agrawal, 2015).

4.3 Theoretical Model
We expand the tax competition model (Devereux, Lockwood, & Redoano, 2007)
to a sequential government game. States and counties act in a Stackelberg competition,
where the upper-tier governments move first(Y.-Q. Wang, 1999). As the tax leaders in the
Stackelberg model, states compete for the state tax rates first. Then, counties observe the
state rates and compete for county tax rates. We also assume that governments at the same
tier move simultaneously to find a Nash equilibrium. Similar to the two-level (Agrawal,
2016) and multi-level models (Agrawal, 2016; Janeba & Osterloh, 2013), our theoretical
model focuses on the tax interaction among two-level local governments.
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4.3.1 Model Framework
Assume there are two states (𝐼𝐼 and 𝐽𝐽) located on a line segment, and each state has

one county (𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗). Sharing the same tax base, each level government can set their own
commodity tax rate freely. The tax is levied based on the transaction location. Governments

are revenue maximizers. States and counties follow a Stackelberg game taking turns setting
tax rates. Since states are higher-level governments, in the first stage, states take the lead,
setting the state-level tax rates (𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 and 𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽 ) to maximize state revenue. The state-level tax

rates are set simultaneously between states. Then, in the second stage, counties observe the
state-level tax rates and simultaneously set the county-level tax rates ( 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 ) to
maximize county revenue. We assume symmetry between same-level governments.

Assume the producer price of commodity (p) is the same in every county and is
normalized into 1: 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 = 1. Then the consumer price of commodity in county i is 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 =
1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 . The consumers maximize their utilities by consuming commodities, where

their indirect utility 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞) = max{𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥) − 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞} and the consumer demand 𝑥𝑥(𝑞𝑞) =
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎{𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥) − 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞}.

𝑥𝑥

We also assume the population is normalized at unit, and the transportation price is

fixed at 𝑐𝑐. Then, consumers living in 𝑖𝑖 will cross-board shop in j only if 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 >𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 , and the
distance constraints for cross-border shopping is 𝑑𝑑 <

1
𝑐𝑐

(𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 )). Therefore, the

tax base of county 𝑖𝑖 allowing cross-border shopping to county 𝑗𝑗 is 𝐵𝐵�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 , 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 � = �1 +
1

𝜌𝜌 �𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑣𝑣�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 ��� 𝑥𝑥(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ), where 𝜌𝜌 = 𝑐𝑐 .
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As a result, state 𝐼𝐼 choses 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 to maximize its state-level tax revenue 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼 :max 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼 =
𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼

𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 𝐵𝐵�1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 , 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 + 𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽 �. Simultaneously, state 𝐽𝐽 chooses 𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽 to maximize its statelevel tax revenue 𝑅𝑅𝐽𝐽 . Then, county 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 observe the state tax rates and choose their
optimal tax rates. The tax revenue maximization for county i is max 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵�1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 +
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖

𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 , 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 + 𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽 �.

4.3.2 Solving the Model

We use backward induction to solve the model. In Stage 2, counties take states’ tax rates
as given and set county-level tax rates simultaneously. Then the F.O.C. (First Order
Condition) for county i is:
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
=0
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖

(4.1)

If a symmetric Nash equilibrium exists with 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 , 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 , and Roy’s identity that

𝑥𝑥(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) = −

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖

, we can solve the equilibrium 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 taking 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 as given, and the equilibrium 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖

is a function of 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 :

𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 ) =

𝑥𝑥(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )
𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥 2 (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑥𝑥 ′ (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )

(4.2)

Since 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0 , as a result, 𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥 2 (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑥𝑥 ′ (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) > 0 . Additionally, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 solves the

maximized 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 , so

𝜕𝜕2 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 2

< 0.

Back to stage 1, states know the reactions of counties and set their optimal state

level tax rates by solving the F.O.C. of the state maximization problem:
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𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 𝐵𝐵 + 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼
=0
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼
�1 + 𝜌𝜌 �𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑣𝑣�𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 ��� 𝑥𝑥(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼

(4.3)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
∗
=0
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼

If the symmetric Nash equilibrium exists, plugging 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 ) according to equation

(4.2), and the equilibrium 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 is solved as:
𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 =

𝑥𝑥(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )
1
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
∗
=
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥 2 (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑥𝑥 ′ (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
+1
+1
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼

(4.4)

Proposition 1. In the Stackelberg game of two-level governments where
Stackelberg equilibrium exists between different-tier governments and symmetric Nash
equilibrium exists among governments from same tiers, the slope of vertical reaction
function is negative if the county tax rate is greater than (or equal to) its domestic state’s
state-level tax rate, while the slope of vertical reaction function is positive if the county tax
rate is less than its domestic state’s state-level tax rate.
From equation (4.4), we can solve that

If 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 , then

𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖

𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼

𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼
=
.
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼
𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼

(4.5)

≥ 0. A county’s tax rate increases with the increase of its

domestic state’s state-level tax rate. However, when 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 < 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 , a county’s tax rate decreases

with the increase of its domestic state’s state-level tax rate.

Proposition 2. In the Stackelberg game of two-level governments where
Stackelberg equilibrium exists between different-tier governments and symmetric Nash
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equilibrium exists among governments from same tiers, the slope of horizontal reaction
function is positive. It means a county’s county-level tax rate is positively affected by the
county-level tax rate of its neighbor county.
With the totally differentiation of equation (4.1) in a symmetric Nash equilibrium,
the slope of the horizontal reaction function is:

𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
=
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗

𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥 2 (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )

+ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )𝑥𝑥 ′ (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )
𝜕𝜕 2 𝑟𝑟
− 2𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖

=

𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥 2 (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) �1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕 2 𝑟𝑟
− 2𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖

𝑥𝑥 ′ (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )
�
𝑥𝑥(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )

(4.6)

If we plug equation (4.2) into (4.6), we can solve that:

𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
=
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗

𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥 2 (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) �1 +

[𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥 2 (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )]2
𝑥𝑥(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )
𝑥𝑥 ′ (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )
∗
�
𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥 2 (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑥𝑥 ′ (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) 𝑥𝑥(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )
𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥 2 (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑥𝑥 ′ (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )
=
>0
𝜕𝜕 2 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕 2 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖
− 2
− 2
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖

Proposition 3. In the Stackelberg game of two-level governments where
Stackelberg equilibrium exists between different-tier governments and symmetric Nash
equilibrium exists among governments from same tiers, the slope of diagonal reaction
function (Agrawal, 2016) is positive. This means a county’s county-level tax rate is
positively affected by its neighbor states’ state-level tax rates, but the magnitude is smaller
than the neighboring counties’ tax effect.
With the total differentiation of equation (4.1) in a symmetric Nash equilibrium,
the slope of the horizontal reaction function is:

𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥 2 (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )𝑥𝑥 ′ (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )
=
=
𝜕𝜕 2 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽
− 2
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
56

𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥 2 (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) �1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕 2 𝑟𝑟
− 2𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖

𝑥𝑥 ′ (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )
�
𝑥𝑥(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )

(4.7)

If we plug equation (4.2) into (4.7), we can solve that

𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
=
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽

𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥 2 (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) �1 +

[𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥 2 (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )]2
𝑥𝑥(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )
𝑥𝑥 ′ (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )
∗
�
𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥 2 (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑥𝑥 ′ (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) 𝑥𝑥(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )
𝜌𝜌𝑥𝑥 2 (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑥𝑥 ′ (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 )
=
>0
𝜕𝜕 2 𝑟𝑟
𝜕𝜕 2 𝑟𝑟
− 2𝑖𝑖
− 2𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖

4.4 Data and Government Tax Strategies
We use a unique grocery tax panel that is hand-assembled from various data
sources. The dataset contains annual state and county level grocery tax rates from 2006 to
2017. The state level grocery tax rates are obtained from Bridging the Gap, while the
county level grocery tax rates are gathered from Tax-Rates.org and state Departments of
Revenue. Our data covers all the counties in the mainland U.S., the four main areas in
Alaska, and all the five counties of Hawaii. Comparing with the previous tax competition
datasets of sales taxes (Agrawal, 2016), one shortcomings of our dataset are that it does not
contain municipal tax rates. We are unable to know how municipal-level governments
interact with upper-level governments and their neighboring jurisdictions.
The summary statistics of grocery tax rates are shown in Table 4.2. Overall, during
our study period, among the 50 states, Washington D.C., and 3,101 counties, there have
been 16 states and 1,036 counties that have implemented the grocery tax policy. For those
with grocery taxes, the average state-level grocery tax rate is 3.644%, with 1% as the
minimum and 7% as the maximum, while the average county-level grocery tax rate is
2.016%, ranging from 0.15% to 7%.
Sharing the same tax base, states and counties can implement their own tax
strategies. States can choose to exempt taxes (state grocery tax rate = 0), tax at limited tax
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rates, or tax at full tax rates (state grocery tax rate = state general sales tax rate).
Correspondingly, counties can also have similar tax strategies. However, some counties
are not authorized to freely set their own county tax rates, but instead follow the state
strategies by setting their county tax rate at a fixed and united number statewide.
The diverse vertical interaction between states and counties should theoretically
form 64 (4*4*4) taxing strategies between the two-level government, but only seven types
of the strategies existed among the U.S. state and county governments (Table 1). The most
frequent tax strategy is double exempt, where states and counties choose to exempt both
levels of grocery tax rates. The second popular strategy adopted by the eight states is the
double full, where states and counties choose to tax both at full general sales tax rates.
There are five states that choose to exempt the state-level tax rate, while their counties
choose to tax. Similarly, there are also four states where states choose to tax a limited rate
but counties tax fully; in these counties’ their taxing strategies are more radical than states.
Our research also controls the county-level demographic variables such as race,
gender, per capita income, and unemployment rates. The demographic data used are from
the U.S. government census.

4.5 Empirical Strategies
We apply similar the empirical equation form as Agrawal (2014), but we also
consider the sequential gaming between states and counties, where states are leaders.
Therefore, the tax reaction function of county i within state I in year y considering vertical,
horizontal, and diagonal tax effects is established as follows:
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𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽−1 + 𝜽𝜽𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(4.8),

where 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the county-level tax rate of county i within state I in year y. 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼−1 is the state-

level tax rate of state I in year 𝑦𝑦 − 1. We use 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼−1 instead of 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 to mimic the sequential
gaming. Since states are leaders in setting tax rates, we assume counties start to set tax rates
in year 𝑦𝑦 one year after states set their tax rates. Similarly, 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the county-level tax rate

of county j within state 𝐽𝐽 in year y. 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a spatial weighting matrix based on the polygon

contiguity between county i and county j, indicating whether county i and j are neighboring
counties. 𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽−1 is the state-level tax rate of state 𝐽𝐽 in year 𝑦𝑦 − 1. 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is another spatial

weighting matrix based on the polygon contiguity between county 𝑖𝑖 and state 𝐽𝐽, indicating
whether county i is near the state border. 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is a vector containing time variant controls

related to the economy, politics and socio-demographic variables that are correlated to the
local grocery sales tax, such as per capital income, the unemployment rate, race and gender.
The controlling vector also includes current state grocery sales taxes 𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 and 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽 . At

last, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is the county-fixed effect controlling for the time-invariant unobserved variables,

and 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦 is the year fixed effect controlling for annual shocks. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes the error term.
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an element of the spatial contiguity matrix 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,
1
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �
0

if i and j are contiguous
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑗𝑗 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

(4.9).

Similarly, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an element of the spatial contiguity matrix 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . The Queen criterion is

used in the binary contiguity, where neighboring jurisdictions are defined as sharing either
common border or vertex. Both matrixes are normalized in rows.
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�1 , 𝛽𝛽
�2 , and 𝛽𝛽
�3 are the estimated slopes of vertical,
Under this identification, 𝛽𝛽

horizontal and diagonal reactions, accounting for the vertical, horizontal and diagonal tax

effects. The parameters are estimated using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE)
method. Since the counties could cluster in group, clustered standard errors at state level
are considered to obtain accurate statistic inference (Cameron & Miller, 2015).

4.6 Results
Our estimates are presented in Table 4.3. Considering all the states and counties in
our sample, the estimates of 𝛽𝛽1 , 𝛽𝛽2 , and 𝛽𝛽3 are -0.102, 0.780, and 0.110, respectively,

shown in column (2). However, not all the three estimates are statistically significant. The
negative coefficient of the state grocery tax rate suggests that state grocery sales taxes
negatively affected county grocery sales taxes. Although the estimate is not statistically
significant, the clustered standard error is relatively small. This estimate result is consistent
with proposition 1. Given the average state grocery sales tax rate (3.644%) is greater than
the average county grocery sales tax rate (2.016%), a county grocery tax rate changes
negatively with its domestic state grocery sales tax rate.
Neighboring counties play the largest role in determining the local county grocery
tax rates. A county will increase its grocery tax rates by 0.78 percentage points if its
neighboring county increases its tax rate by one percentage point tax rate on average. The
estimate is statistically significant at 10% significance level. Neighboring state tax rates
can also affect a county’s grocery tax rate. A county is expected to increase its grocery tax
rate by 0.11 percentage point when its neighboring states increase state grocery tax rate by
one percentage point on average, holding other variables constant. This estimate is
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statistically significant at 1% significance level. To compare the diagonal tax effect with
the horizontal tax effect, the estimated diagonal tax effect is smaller than the horizontal tax
effect, suggesting that neighboring states have limited tax effect on counties. Furthermore,
the Wald test result shows that the spatial parameter coefficients are significantly different
from zero, indicating that county grocery tax rates are spatially correlated with the tax rates
of neighboring counties and states.
Since there are 31 states and their corresponding counties that have adopted a
double exempt strategy, the spatial correlations are overestimated by taking them into
consideration. In column (3) and (4), we exclude Type 1 jurisdictions (Table 4.1) where
double exempt strategies are adopted, and only include the remaining 20 states and their
corresponding counties. The signals of the main estimates stay the same, but the magnitude
of the three effects get smaller. The empirical results are consistent with the derived
propositions in our theoretical model.

4.7 Conclusion and Discussion
During the past two decades, seven more states consecutively exempted groceries
from sales taxes. Although there are still thirteen states remained holding the grocery sales
taxes, five of them levy the taxes at limited rates, and three of them provide different levels
of tax refund credits. At least at the state level, exemption, as well as reduction in grocery
sales taxes has become a trend. Many governments exempted the tax in terms of equality
since most jurisdictions have already exempted taxing groceries. Additionally, grocery
taxes exaggerate inequality as the low-SES populations tend to spend a larger proportion
of their income on groceries.
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It is an important decision for all levels of local governments regarding whether to
tax groceries. A growing number of researchers and policy makers have been exploring
how food and beverage taxes can impact consumers’ eating and drinking behavior
(Fletcher et al., 2010c; Zhen et al., 2014). Grocery taxes gain the advantages as such a
policy instrument since they are imposed on wider types of groceries than most single food
and beverage taxes which only tax a specific type of groceries. The impacts of grocery
sales taxes are more salient than the single base taxes such as fat taxes and sweetened
beverage taxes.
Our study, in a framework of tax competition, investigates that the driven factors
of county grocery sales tax rate changes come from three sources: its neighboring county’s
grocery tax rates have a positive horizontal effect, its mother state government has a
negative vertical effect, and its neighboring state governments have a slightly positive
diagonal effect. Our research confirms the tax competition theory in grocery sales taxes
that multi-level local governments interacted in a game. Governments choose grocery tax
rates to maximize government revenue considering cross-border shopping and federalism.
Additionally, the findings help to explain the diversity of grocery sales tax rates. The
diverse tax rates are not only due to horizontal competition but are also results of diverse
interacted strategies between states and counties. Furthermore, as increasing numbers of
states and counties consider changing their grocery tax policies, our study addresses the
interaction among multi-level governments, helping policy makers to balance the costs and
benefits of the tax changes.
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Tables and Figures of Chapter 4
Table 4.1 Vertical Taxing Strategy Types, 2006-2017
Vertical Interaction Strategies
Exempt
Limited
State
Full
Exempt
Fixed
County Limited
Changed
Full
Numbers of States
State Abbreviations

Type1

Type2

Type3

Type4

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
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Y

Y

1
SC

2
LA,
NC

Type5

Type6

Y

Y

Type7

Y

Y
Y
2
AK,
GA

3
UT,
VA,
IL

Y

Y

4
MO,
AR,
TN,
WV

8
AL,
HI,
ID,
KS,
MS,
OK,
SD,
WY

Notes: a. The table is generated using our state and county tax dataset.
b. The Type 1 states include AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, DC, FL, IN, IA, KY, ME, MD, MA,
MI, MN, MT, NE, NV, NH, NJ, NY, ND, OH, OR, PA, RI, TX, VT, WA, and WI.
c. In 2009 and 2013, Wyoming and West Virginia exempted grocery taxes at state and
county levels.
d. Georgia exempted state-level grocery taxes in 2000, while Louisiana and North Carolina
exempted state-level grocery taxes in 2002. But county-level grocery taxes are permitted
in the three states.
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Table 4.2 Grocery Sales Tax Rates at State and County Levels, 2006-2017
State
County
Grocery Tax Rate (Mean)

3.644%

2.016%

Grocery Tax Rate (Min)

1.000%

0.150%

Grocery Tax Rate (Max)

7.000%

7.000%

Numbers of With-Tax
Jurisdictions

16

1,036
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Table 4.3 Vertical, Horizontal and Diagonal Tax Effect Results
(1)
(2)
State Tax Rate (𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼 )

Average Neighboring County Tax Rate
(𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 )
Average Neighboring State Tax Rate
(𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝜏𝜏𝐽𝐽 )

All States

All States

-0.102
(0.08)

-0.102
(0.08)

(3)
Judications
with Taxes
-0.084
(0.06)

0.781***
(0.11)

0.780***
(0.11)

0.760***
(0.10)

0.109*
(0.06)

0.110*
(0.06)

0.091*
(0.03)

Controlling Variables
N
Y
Y
County Fixed Effect
Y
Y
Y
Year Fixed Effect
Y
Y
Y
Counties
3,101
3,101
1,432
Observations
34,111
34,111
15,752
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 4.1 The Exemption and Distribution of State Grocery Tax Rates

66

Figure 4.2 State-Level Grocery Tax Rates, 2006-2017
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. ABBREVIATIONS

COVID-19: coronavirus disease 2019
BMI: body mass index
CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
BRFSS: Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
REIS: Regional Economic Information System
UCR: Uniform Crime Reporting
DUI: driving under the influence
BCR: benefit-cost ratio
SES: socioeconomic status
FAH: food at home
FAFH: food away from home
SNAP: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
PSID: Panel Study of Income Dynamics
FE: Fixed Effect
OVB: omitted variable bias
F.O.C.: First Order Condition
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APPENDIX 2. Full Regression Results Health Outcomes on Grocery and Restaurant Sales
Taxes

VARIABLES
Total grocery sales tax rate
Total restaurant sales tax rate
(1+Grocery Tax)/(1+Restaurant Tax)
Grocery stores
Fastfood restaurants
Full-service restaurants
Cost per meal
White
Black
Female
Hispanic
Income per capita
Employees' share of total population
Share of bachelor’s degree or higher
of the 25-year- and-over population
Smoking rate
Drinking rate
Drug arrest rate
DUI

(1)
obesity

(2)
diabetes

(3)
obesity

(4)
diabetes

0.588***
(0.154)
-0.158
(0.127)

0.215**
(0.098)
-0.127
(0.101)
-1.113***
(0.406)
0.289
(0.228)
-0.063
(0.181)
-0.512***
(0.182)
1.993
(5.913)
23.179***
(7.179)
-5.143
(7.582)
-5.802
(5.561)
0.010
(0.008)
-1.045
(1.161)

4.760***
(1.169)
-0.215
(1.258)
-0.377
(0.570)
0.091
(0.518)
-0.720*
(0.385)
11.088
(14.926)
53.523**
(24.572)
-15.609
(17.481)
-19.886*
(10.054)
0.026*
(0.013)
-7.353*
(3.762)

1.296**
(0.571)
-1.101***
(0.408)
0.292
(0.228)
-0.062
(0.183)
-0.522***
(0.184)
1.994
(5.901)
22.997***
(7.167)
-5.151
(7.566)
-5.607
(5.523)
0.010
(0.008)
-1.011
(1.168)

-0.244
(1.262)
-0.377
(0.569)
0.080
(0.517)
-0.735*
(0.386)
11.058
(14.889)
53.462**
(24.510)
-15.464
(17.564)
-19.896*
(10.077)
0.025*
(0.014)
-7.258*
(3.752)
-0.032
(0.045)
0.002
(0.030)
-0.020
(0.023)
4.294***
(0.241)
-5.908***

-0.016
(0.018)
0.004
(0.008)
-0.010
(0.013)
-1.055***
(0.125)
1.619***

-0.032
(0.045)
0.002
(0.030)
-0.020
(0.023)
4.290***
(0.240)
-5.903***

-0.016
(0.018)
0.004
(0.008)
-0.010
(0.014)
-1.054***
(0.125)
1.619***

Constant
Observations
R-squared

(0.384)
32.161*
(18.835)

(0.176)
11.305
(7.253)

(0.384)
30.258
(18.697)

(0.178)
10.356
(7.262)

9,779
0.910

9,779
0.928

9,779
0.910

9,779
0.928

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistically significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.

70

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abdus, S., & Cawley, J. (2008). Simulating the impact of a “fat tax” on body weight (Job
market paper). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.
Agrawal, D. R. (2014). LOST in America: Evidence on local sales taxes from national
panel data. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 49, 147-163.
Agrawal, D. R. (2015). The tax gradient: Spatial aspects of fiscal competition. American
Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 7(2), 1-29.
Agrawal, D. R. (2016). Local fiscal competition: An application to sales taxation with
multiple federations. Journal of Urban Economics, 91, 122-138.
Agrawal, D. R., Hoyt, W. H., & Wilson, J. D. Local Policy Choice: Theory and Empirics.
Journal of Economic Literature.
Alaimo, K., Olson, C. M., & Frongillo, E. A. (2001). Low family income and food
insufficiency in relation to overweight in US children: is there a paradox?
Archives of pediatrics & adolescent medicine, 155(10), 1161-1167.
Allais, O., Bertail, P., & Nichèle, V. (2020). The effects of a" fat tax" on the nutrient
intake of French households.
Allcott, H., Lockwood, B. B., & Taubinsky, D. (2019). Regressive sin taxes, with an
application to the optimal soda tax. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 134(3),
1557-1626.
American Diabetes Association. (2018). Economic Costs of Diabetes in the US in 2017.
Diabetes care, 41, 917.
Andreyeva, T., Long, M. W., & Brownell, K. D. (2010). The impact of food prices on
consumption: a systematic review of research on the price elasticity of demand for
food. American journal of public health, 100(2), 216-222.
Association, A. D. (2018). Economic costs of diabetes in the US in 2017. Diabetes care,
41(5), 917-928.
Barnett, A., Eff, C., Leslie, R. D., & Pyke, D. (1981). Diabetes in identical twins.
Diabetologia, 20(2), 87-93.
Bødker, M., Pisinger, C., Toft, U., & Jørgensen, T. (2015). The rise and fall of the
world's first fat tax. Health policy, 119(6), 737-742.
Braid, R. M. (2000). A spatial model of tax competition with multiple tax instruments.
Journal of Urban Economics, 47(1), 88-114.

Burge, G., & Rogers, C. (2011). Local option sales taxes and consumer spending
patterns: Fiscal interdependence under multi-tiered local taxation. Regional
Science and Urban Economics, 41(1), 46-58.
Cameron, A. C., & Miller, D. L. (2015). A practitioner’s guide to cluster-robust
inference. Journal of human resources, 50(2), 317-372.
Cawley, J. (2015). An economy of scales: A selective review of obesity's economic
causes, consequences, and solutions. Journal of health economics, 43, 244-268.
Cawley, J., & Ruhm, C. J. (2011). The economics of risky health behaviors. In Handbook
of health economics (Vol. 2, pp. 95-199): Elsevier.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2018). Methods and references for countylevel estimates and ranks and state-level modeled estimates.
Centers for Disease Control Prevention. (2016). Behavioral risk factor surveillance
system survey data. Atlanta, Georgia: U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. .
Chetty, R., Looney, A., & Kroft, K. (2009). Salience and taxation: Theory and evidence.
American Economic Review, 99(4), 1145-1177.
tax reduce consumption, but the magnititude is small
Chou, S.-Y., Grossman, M., & Saffer, H. (2004). An economic analysis of adult obesity:
results from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. Journal of health
economics, 23(3), 565-587.
Cohen, A. K., Rai, M., Rehkopf, D. H., & Abrams, B. (2013). Educational attainment and
obesity: a systematic review. Obesity reviews, 14(12), 989-1005.
Cook, J. T., Frank, D. A., Berkowitz, C., Black, M. M., Casey, P. H., Cutts, D. B., . . .
Levenson, S. (2004). Food insecurity is associated with adverse health outcomes
among human infants and toddlers. The Journal of nutrition, 134(6), 1432-1438.
Courtemanche, C., Tchernis, R., & Ukert, B. (2018). The effect of smoking on obesity:
Evidence from a randomized trial. Journal of health economics, 57, 31-44.
Creighton, R. (2010). Fat taxes: the newest manifestation of the age-old excise tax. The
Journal of Legal Medicine, 31(1), 123-136.
Darmon, N., & Drewnowski, A. (2015). Contribution of food prices and diet cost to
socioeconomic disparities in diet quality and health: a systematic review and
analysis. Nutrition reviews, 73(10), 643-660.

72

Devereux, M. P., Lockwood, B., & Redoano, M. (2007). Horizontal and vertical indirect
tax competition: Theory and some evidence from the USA. Journal of public
economics, 91(3-4), 451-479.
Dharmasena, S., & Capps Jr, O. (2012). Intended and unintended consequences of a
proposed national tax on sugar‐sweetened beverages to combat the US obesity
problem. Health economics, 21(6), 669-694.
Dong, D., Zheng, Y., & Stewart, H. (2020). The effects of food sales taxes on household
food spending: An application of a censored cluster model. Agricultural
Economics, 51(5), 669-684.
Dunifon, R., & Kowaleski-Jones, L. (2003). The influences of participation in the
National School Lunch Program and food insecurity on child well-being. Social
Service Review, 77(1), 72-92.
Esteller-Moré, Á., & Solé-Ollé, A. (2001). Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal
interdependence: evidence from the US. Regional Science and Urban Economics,
31(2-3), 247-272.
Ezzati, M., Lopez, A. D., Rodgers, A. A., & Murray, C. J. (2004). Comparative
quantification of health risks: global and regional burden of disease attributable
to selected major risk factors: World Health Organization.
Feeding America. (2018). Map the meal gap: hunger & poverty in the United States.
Finkelstein, E. A., Ruhm, C. J., & Kosa, K. M. (2005). Economic causes and
consequences of obesity. Annu. Rev. Public Health, 26, 239-257.
Finkelstein, E. A., Zhen, C., Bilger, M., Nonnemaker, J., Farooqui, A. M., & Todd, J. E.
(2013). Implications of a sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) tax when substitutions
to non-beverage items are considered. Journal of health economics, 32(1), 219239.
Flegal, K. M., Carroll, M. D., Kuczmarski, R. J., & Johnson, C. L. (1998). Overweight
and obesity in the United States: prevalence and trends, 1960–1994. International
journal of obesity, 22(1), 39-47.
Fletcher, J. M., Frisvold, D., & Tefft, N. (2010a). Can soft drink taxes reduce population
weight? Contemporary economic policy, 28(1), 23-35.
Fletcher, J. M., Frisvold, D., & Tefft, N. (2010b). Taxing soft drinks and restricting
access to vending machines to curb child obesity. Health affairs, 29(5), 10591066.

73

Fletcher, J. M., Frisvold, D. E., & Tefft, N. (2010c). The effects of soft drink taxes on
child and adolescent consumption and weight outcomes. Journal of public
economics, 94(11-12), 967-974.
French, S. A. (2003). Pricing effects on food choices. The Journal of nutrition, 133(3),
841S-843S.
Goldman, D., Lakdawalla, D., & Zheng, Y. (2009). Food Prices and the Dynamics of
Body Weight. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, NBER Working
Papers: 15096. Retrieved from
http://ezproxy.uky.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=tr
ue&db=ecn&AN=1045997&site=ehost-live&scope=site
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15096.pdf
Fat tax could reduce obesity, small magnitude in short time, large magnitude in
long term; model
Goryakin, Y., Monsivais, P., & Suhrcke, M. (2017). Soft drink prices, sales, body mass
index and diabetes: Evidence from a panel of low-, middle-and high-income
countries. Food policy, 73, 88-94.
fat tax reduces fat for low income countries, but heterogeneous results
Greenhalgh‐Stanley, N., Rohlin, S., & Thompson, J. (2018). Food sales taxes and
employment. Journal of Regional Science, 58(5), 1003-1016.
Gustavsen, G. W., & Rickertsen, K. (2013). Adjusting VAT rates to promote healthier
diets in Norway: A censored quantile regression approach. Food Policy, 42, 8895.
Harris, J. L., Pomeranz, J. L., Lobstein, T., & Brownell, K. D. (2009). A crisis in the
marketplace: how food marketing contributes to childhood obesity and what can
be done. Annual review of public health, 30, 211-225.
Haufler, A. (1998). Asymmetric commodity tax competition—comment on de
Crombrugghe and Tulkens. Journal of public economics, 67(1), 135-144.
Janeba, E., & Osterloh, S. (2013). Tax and the city—A theory of local tax competition.
Journal of public economics, 106, 89-100.
Jensen, J. D., & Smed, S. (2013). The Danish tax on saturated fat–short run effects on
consumption, substitution patterns and consumer prices of fats. Food Policy, 42,
18-31.
Jetter, K. M., & Cassady, D. L. (2006). The availability and cost of healthier food
alternatives. American journal of preventive medicine, 30(1), 38-44.
Kanbur, R., & Keen, M. (1993). Jeux sans frontiers: tax competition and tax coordination
when provinces differ in size. American Economic Review, 83(4).

74

Kanter, R., & Caballero, B. (2012). Global gender disparities in obesity: a review.
Advances in nutrition, 3(4), 491-498.
Keen, M., & Kotsogiannis, C. (2003). Leviathan and capital tax competition in
federations. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 5(2), 177-199.
Keen, M. J., & Kotsogiannis, C. (2002). Does federalism lead to excessively high taxes?
American Economic Review, 92(1), 363-370.
Keen, M. J., & Kotsogiannis, C. (2004). Tax competition in federations and the welfare
consequences of decentralization. Journal of Urban Economics, 56(3), 397-407.
Khan, T., Powell, L. M., & Wada, R. (2012). Fast food consumption and food prices:
evidence from panel data on 5th and 8th grade children. Journal of obesity, 2012.
Kim, D. D., & Basu, A. (2016). Estimating the medical care costs of obesity in the United
States: systematic review, meta-analysis, and empirical analysis. Value in Health,
19(5), 602-613.
Kornfield, R., Huang, J., Vera, L., & Emery, S. L. (2015). Rapidly increasing
promotional expenditures for e-cigarettes. Tobacco control, 24(2), 110-111.
Lucas, V. (2004). Cross-border shopping in a federal economy. Regional Science and
Urban Economics, 34(4), 365-385.
Marx, J. (2002). Unraveling the causes of diabetes. Science, 296(5568), 686.
McLaren, L. (2007). Socioeconomic status and obesity. Epidemiologic reviews, 29(1),
29-48.
Mhurchu, C. N., Eyles, H., Genc, M., Scarborough, P., Rayner, M., Mizdrak, A., . . .
Blakely, T. (2015). Effects of health-related food taxes and subsidies on mortality
from diet-related disease in New Zealand: an econometric-epidemiologic
modelling study. PLoS ONE, 10(7), e0128477.
Mintz, J., & Tulkens, H. (1986). Commodity tax competition between member states of a
federation: equilibrium and efficiency. Journal of public economics, 29(2), 133172.
Mytton, O., Gray, A., Rayner, M., & Rutter, H. (2007). Could targeted food taxes
improve health? Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health, 61(8), 689-694.
Ng, S. W., & Popkin, B. M. (2012). Time use and physical activity: a shift away from
movement across the globe. Obesity reviews, 13(8), 659-680.

75

Ohsawa, Y. (1999). Cross-border shopping and commodity tax competition among
governments. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 29(1), 33-51.
Paarlberg, R., Mozaffarian, D., & Micha, R. (2017). Can US local soda taxes continue to
spread? Food Policy, 71, 1-7.
Pereira, M. A., Kartashov, A. I., Ebbeling, C. B., Van Horn, L., Slattery, M. L., Jacobs Jr,
D. R., & Ludwig, D. S. (2005). Fast-food habits, weight gain, and insulin
resistance (the CARDIA study): 15-year prospective analysis. The lancet,
365(9453), 36-42.
Pickett, K. E., Kelly, S., Brunner, E., Lobstein, T., & Wilkinson, R. G. (2005). Wider
income gaps, wider waistbands? An ecological study of obesity and income
inequality. Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health, 59(8), 670-674.
Popkin, B. M. (2015). Nutrition transition and the global diabetes epidemic. Current
diabetes reports, 15(9), 64.
Powell, L. M., & Chaloupka, F. J. (2009). Food prices and obesity: evidence and policy
implications for taxes and subsidies. The Milbank Quarterly, 87(1), 229-257.
Powell, L. M., Chaloupka, F. J., & Bao, Y. (2007). The availability of fast-food and fullservice restaurants in the United States: associations with neighborhood
characteristics. American journal of preventive medicine, 33(4), S240-S245.
Powell, L. M., & Chriqui, J. F. (2011). Food taxes and subsidies: Evidence and policies
for obesity prevention. The Oxford handbook of the social science of obesity.
Oxford University Press, New York, 639-664.
Russell, J. D., & Bostrom, A. (2016). Federalism, Dillon rule and home rule. American
City County Exchange. White paper: A publication of the American city county
exchange. Arlington, VA: author. Retrieved from https://www. alec.
org/app/uploads/2016/01/2016-ACCE-White-Paper-Dillon-House-Rule-Final.
pdf.
Rydell, S. A., Harnack, L. J., Oakes, J. M., Story, M., Jeffery, R. W., & French, S. A.
(2008). Why eat at fast-food restaurants: reported reasons among frequent
consumers. Journal of the American Dietetic Association, 108(12), 2066-2070.
Sastry, N., Fomby, P., & McGonagle, K. (2018). Using the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) to conduct life course health development analysis. Handbook
of life course health development, 579-599.
Sayon-Orea, C., Martinez-Gonzalez, M. A., & Bes-Rastrollo, M. (2011). Alcohol
consumption and body weight: a systematic review. Nutrition reviews, 69(8), 419431.
76

Slack, K. S., & Yoo, J. (2005). Food hardship and child behavior problems among lowincome children. Social Service Review, 79(3), 511-536.
Srithongrung, A. (2017). Consumers' Behavioral Response to Sales Taxes on Food in
Kansas. Public Finance and Management, 17(2), 92-123.
doi:http://pfm.spaef.org/articles
Consistent with my topic
Sturm, R., Powell, L. M., Chriqui, J. F., & Chaloupka, F. J. (2010). Soda taxes, soft drink
consumption, and children’s body mass index. Health Affairs, 29(5), 1052-1058.
Tate, K. (2018). How Do I Tax Thee?: A Field Guide to the Great American Rip-off: All
Points Books.
Teng, A. M., Jones, A. C., Mizdrak, A., Signal, L., Genç, M., & Wilson, N. (2019).
Impact of sugar‐sweetened beverage taxes on purchases and dietary intake:
Systematic review and meta‐analysis. Obesity Reviews, 20(9), 1187-1204.
Thorp, A. A., Owen, N., Neuhaus, M., & Dunstan, D. W. (2011). Sedentary behaviors
and subsequent health outcomes in adults: a systematic review of longitudinal
studies, 1996–2011. American journal of preventive medicine, 41(2), 207-215.
Tiffin, R., & Arnoult, M. (2011). The public health impacts of a fat tax. European journal
of clinical nutrition, 65(4), 427-433.
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. (2017). Regional economic information system
(REIS).
U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2018). Uniform crime reporting (UCR) program.
U.S. Census Bureau. (2018). County business patterns.
U.S. Census Bureau. (2018.). Population estimates program.
Vandegrift, D., & Yoked, T. (2004). Obesity rates, income, and suburban sprawl: an
analysis of US states. Health & Place, 10(3), 221-229.
Veuger, S., Shoag, D., & Tuttle, C. (2019). Rules versus home rule: Local government
responses to negative revenue shocks. Retrieved from
Wang, L., Zheng, Y., Buck, S., Dong, D., & Kaiser, H. M. (2021). Grocery food taxes
and US county obesity and diabetes rates. Health economics review, 11(1), 1-9.
Wang, Y.-Q. (1999). Commodity taxes under fiscal competition: Stackelberg equilibrium
and optimality. American Economic Review, 89(4), 974-981.

77

Weinreb, L., Wehler, C., Perloff, J., Scott, R., Hosmer, D., Sagor, L., & Gundersen, C.
(2002). Hunger: its impact on children’s health and mental health. Pediatrics,
110(4), e41-e41.
Whitaker, R. C., Phillips, S. M., & Orzol, S. M. (2006). Food insecurity and the risks of
depression and anxiety in mothers and behavior problems in their preschool-aged
children. Pediatrics, 118(3), e859-e868.
Wiggins, S., Keats, S., Han, E., Shimokawa, S., Alberto, J., Hernández, V., & Clara, R.
(2015). The rising cost of a healthy diet. Changing relative prices of foods in
high-income and emerging economies. London: Overseas Development Institute.
Wilson, J. D. (1999). Theories of tax competition. National Tax Journal, 269-304.
Wilson, N. L., Zheng, Y., Burney, S., & Kaiser, H. M. (2016a). Do Grocery Food Sales
Taxes Cause Food Insecurity? Retrieved from
grocery sales tax increase
food insecurity, SNAP decrease food insecurity
Wilson, N. L., Zheng, Y., Burney, S., & Kaiser, H. M. (2016b). Do Grocery Food Sales
Taxes Cause Food Insecurity? Paper presented at the 2016 Annual Meeting, July
31-August 2, 2016, Boston, Massachusetts.
Wolf, A. M., Gortmaker, S. L., Cheung, L., Gray, H. M., Herzog, D. B., & Colditz, G. A.
(1993). Activity, inactivity, and obesity: racial, ethnic, and age differences among
schoolgirls. American journal of public health, 83(11), 1625-1627.
Yaniv, G., Rosin, O., & Tobol, Y. (2009). Junk-food, home cooking, physical activity
and obesity: The effect of the fat tax and the thin subsidy. Journal of public
economics, 93(5-6), 823-830.
Zhen, C., Finkelstein, E. A., Nonnemaker, J. M., Karns, S. A., & Todd, J. E. (2014).
Predicting the effects of sugar-sweetened beverage taxes on food and beverage
demand in a large demand system. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
96(1), 1-25.
Zheng, Y., Dong, D., Burney, S., & Kaiser, H. M. (2019a). Eat at Home or Away from
Home? The Role of Grocery and Restaurant Food Sales Taxes. Journal of
Agricultural and Resource Economics, 44(1835-2019-065), 98.
Zheng, Y., Dong, D., Burney, S., & Kaiser, H. M. (2019b). Eat at Home or Away from
Home? The Role of Grocery and Restaurant Food Sales Taxes. Journal of
Agricultural and Resource Economics, 44(1).
Zheng, Y., & Kaiser, H. M. (2008). Advertising and US nonalcoholic beverage demand.
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 37(2), 147-159.

78

Zheng, Y., McLaughlin, E. W., & Kaiser, H. M. (2012). Taxing food and beverages:
theory, evidence, and policy. American journal of agricultural economics, 95(3),
705-723.
tax reduce consumption, but the magnitude is small
Zheng, Y., Zhao, J. J., Buck, S., Burney, S., Kaiser, H. M., & Wilson, N. L. (2021).
Putting grocery food taxes on the table: Evidence for food security policy-makers.
Food Policy, 101, 102098.
Zimmet, P. (1982). Type 2 (non-insulin-dependent) diabetes—an epidemiological
overview. Diabetologia, 22(6), 399-411.

79

VITA
Education
University of Kentucky
Advisors: Yuqing Zheng (Chair), Steve Buck (Co-chair)
Cornell University, Dyson School of Applied Economics
Visiting Researcher, working with Dr. Harry M. Kaiser
National University of Political Studies and Public
Administration
Visiting Student
Ocean University of China
Master of Science (Economics)

Lexington, KY
Aug. 2021
Ithaca, NY
Spring 2020
Bucharest, Romania
Spring 2016
Qingdao, China
Jun. 2017

Central China Normal University
Wuhan, China
Bachelor of Arts (Major: Economics; Minor: Philosophy)
Jul. 2014
Journal Publications
Lingxiao Wang, Yuqing Zheng, and Steven C. Buck. “How Does the Affordable Care
Act Affect Cigarette Consumption? –The Mechanism and Heterogeneity.” Forthcoming
in Journal of Consumer Affairs
Lingxiao Wang, Yuqing Zheng, Steven C. Buck, Diansheng Dong, Stewart Hayden,
and Harry M. Kaiser. “Grocery Food Taxes and U.S. County Obesity and Diabetes
Rates”, Health Economics Review, 11(1) (February 2021), pp. 1-9
Lingxiao Wang, Adelina Dumitrescu Peculea, and Handuo Xu. “The Relationship
between Public Expenditure and Economic Growth in Romania: Wagner’s or Keynes’s
Law”, Theoretical and Applied Economics, No. 562 (September 2016), pp. 56-68
Lingxiao Wang, Wenkang Zhang, Yao Gong and Lin Zhong “The Effective Way of
the Supply of Club Goods Based on Multivariate Matrix---Take the Tunnel and Bridges
in Wuhan as an Example”, Contemporary Economics, No. 17 (September 2013), pp.
132-134.
Papers under Journal Review
Yuqing Zheng, Lingxiao Wang, Shuoli Zhao, and Wuyang Hu. “Corona Beer in
Coronavirus Pandemic: Impact of Unintentional Negative Name Association”
Shuoli Zhao, Lingxiao Wang, Wuyang Hu, and Yuqing Zheng. “Meet the Meatless:
Demand for New Generation Plant-Based Meat Alternatives”
Working Papers
- Dissertation Essay 2: Causal Effect of Grocery Sales Tax on Obesity
- Dissertation Essay 3: Spatial Grocery Tax Competition
- Impacts of “Non-Meat” Labeling on the Meat-alternative Sales

Teaching and Professional Experience
Independent Instructor
Teaching Assistant
Professional Services
Graduate Student Congress Representative of
Agricultural Economics
Department Graduate Research Committee
Representative
Journal Reviewer for Value in Health, China
Agricultural Economics Review and Marine Policy

University of Kentucky 2019
University of Kentucky 2018
University of Kentucky
August 2018-Present
August 2019-Present
2019-Present

Grants
Richards Graduate Student Research Activity Grant. $750, 2020-2021
Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities Thesis. “Charging problems
of Six Bridges and One Tunnel in Wuhan” PI: Lingxiao Wang, co-PIs: Wenkang Zhang,
Yao Gong and Lin Zhong, ￥5,000, Jun 2012-Sep 2013
Honor and Awards
Graduate Research Assistantship of University of Kentucky,
Department of Agricultural Economics
Academic First-Class Scholarship, Ocean University of China
First Prize of 4th Postgraduate’s Marine Forum of Beibu Gulf Rim
First Prize of the 14th Challenge Cup National University Science and
Technology Competition

81

2017-2021
2016
2015
2015

